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PREFACE 
The proposals of E.G. Liberman suggest a reform of the Soviet 
economic administration which would allow a more effective use of the 
country's economic resources. His suggestions call for improvements 
in planning efficiency and operating incentives with more emphasis on 
profitability as the key success indicator for evaluating enterprise 
performance. These proposals generated a great volume of controversy 
in Soviet economic thought and brought into the open frank considera-
tion of the ·problems of capital allocation, profits, and the Soviet 
system of pricing and material-allotments. The purpose ofthis thesis 
. 
is to investigate Liberman's proposals critically and to assess their 
impact on Soviet economic thought. 
I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Dr. Julian H. 
Bradsher, Professor of Economics at Oklahoma State University, in 
advising me and directing my efforts in writing this thesis. 
I am also indebted to Dr. Julian H. Bradsher, Dr. Rudolph w. Trenton, 
and Dr. Alfred Levin for providing me with the intellectual stimulation 
which directed my interests to the study of economic systems, inter-
national economics, and the Russian economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
P;roblem 
The Soviet economy is essentially a planned economy of command. At 
the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October. 
1961, a New Party Program was adop~ed which stated fundamental proposi-
tions to be used in assessing established planning practice: (1) "The 
• .. .I -- ~ 
. - -
economic independence and the rights of local orgaµs and enierprises 
"'• ~,. ,,~".' '• •., •'•,: -~r. ? '-- .. t;._ .. •_ • .. ~L. _-: ~ ·~ 
will continue to expand within the framework of the single natioiial 
1_ .. ' - • •• • 
.• "' - .. \, ,· t- :.,_ ........ _, 
economic plan"" Plans and recommendations made at lower levels, beginning 
with enterprises must play an increasing role in planning," (2) •iTbe 
entire system of planning and assessing the work of central aiid local 
organizations, enterprises and collective farms, m~st stimulaee their 
interest in higher targets and in the maximum dissemination of advan.~ed 
production experience, ~,l This "official" concern of th~·~~· party prC>-!' 
gram with th• role of the enterprise in planning and the incentive 
system under which the firm operates led Evsei Grigorievich Liberman* 
~. G. iiberman, "Planning Production and Standards of Long-Term 
Op@J"(lti~n," Problems of Economics, "English translation of the U,S,S,ll~ 
monthly journal, Voprosy ekonomiki." (New York, International Arts 
and Sciences Press," Voll' V, 118, December, 1962), P• 16" 
*Evsei Grigor:levich Liberman is ·Cbaitnl&a of th~ De.p-.r~t ·of 
Politic:,al Ecoiiomy of the Markov Institute of Technology, 
1 
2 
to summarize the problems of planning on the enterprise level. As an 
introduction to his proposals, Liberman stated that "p~esent procedure 
of planning the work of enterprises stifles their initiative, does not 
permit the maximum utilization of production potentialities and the 
advantages of the new system of management, and does not make enter-
• ,•, I 
2 prises interested in further raising the efficiency of production." 
Briefly, the problem to which the Liberman proposa~s are addressed 
is the inefficiency experienced at the firm level under the Soviet 
• '.. t 
system of planning. 
·Purpose 
The Liberman proposals suggest a modification of the relationship 
L, ~. ;_. : 
between the enterprise and the planning process to reduce the existing 
inefficiency in_ the operation of th~ enterprise. On September 9, 196!, 
his proposals were published in Pravda and were exposed to western 
• • ' .•• ,; • • ·1.. ·• • .:, ' • ' • • • • ' • 3 
readers for the first time on a widespread basis. The subsequent 
' ~ . 
attention they received generated support, criticism, and modification. 
• I•' I - • ' i, ' 
This controversy raises the question: Have the Liberman proposals had 
• I , , ' ' I .t· 
any effect on Soviet economic thought? The purpose of this thes1.s is 
. . 
.,·.,; ·-· 
to investigate these proposals critically, to assess their impact on 
Soviet economic thought, and to evaluate the hypothesis that these pro-
.... 
.. .. . • ·' 
posals have had a positive effect on the development of contemporary 
Soviet thought relati•e to rationality in planning. 
2 ; 
Liberman. P• 16. 
3A1ec Nove, "The Liberman Proposals." Survey. (London, April, 
1963), P• 112. 
3 
Procedure 
A descriptive and historical background of the Soviet system and 
its problems is presented in Chapter II to supply an overview of the 
system with which the Liberman proposals are concerned. This back-
ground begins with an ~haustiv~ description of.the economy and the 
social framework within which the economy operates in order to consider 
planning in its proper perspective. The historical evolution of the 
Soviet system is also discussed here to provide a point of reference 
from which planning structure and the mechanics of plan formulation are 
considered prior to a discussion of planning, per se, and its inherent 
problems. Planning is then discussed in terms of the goals toward 
which the plan is aimed and the success indicators by which achieve-
' . 
ments are evaluated. The role of rationality in Soviet planning is 
then considered. The-performance of the Soviet economy is briefly 
. . 
·. ..,,, 
viewed in terms of.its· implications as to the development of Soviet 
economic thought. 
After developing this institutional and historical background, 
the Liberman proposals are introduced in Chapter III with a brief 
. . •, 
summary of their evoluation from their inception in 195S to their 
publication in Pravda in 1962. Next.the· examination of these proposals 
is divided into two parts. The relationship between the enterprise 
. . . 
and the planning authority relative to instructions, indicators, and 
autonomy of action ia discussed in the first part. In the second 
part, the use of incentives to achieve efficient production are 
considered. 
4 
In Chapter IV, the proposals are evaluated with respect to the 
different opinions and criticisms they generated. This evaluation is 
divided into three parts which reflect the different categories of 
literature surrounding the Liberman proposals. The first category 
consists of opinions which were against the proposals for economic or 
ideological reasons; the second entails a consideration of tbe''mod-
erates" who attempted to modify the proposals; the third category deals 
with the endorsements ot' the proposals. 
Chapter V 1s.·di~ided into two ·parts. The first part ·presents a 
summary of tbe evaluations and the subsequent conclusions relative to 
the hypothesis of this thesis·:· The Liberman proposals· have had a 
positive·effect'on ·the development of contemporary Soviet thought 
relati~e to rationality ,in planning~ The sr~ct>nd pa.rt: ic·en'ters on the 
:lmplications·of the Liberman proposals for the future and suggests 
areas fo.; furthei sfudy. ,' 
Limitations 
There are ·t\lcf'principal limitations to the scope of this study. 
The moat obvious limitation :ls the fact that much of the literature 
and opinion which emerges in the Soviet Union is not translated into 
western 3·oumals or is not avail:able in print at all. ·The other major 
limitation is that the suaastiona contained in the Liberman proposals 
have not been ·applied to the Soviet' economy in practice on a laqe-
scale basis, and consequently, they cannot be evaluated as practically 
and objectively as one might desire. 
CHAPTER II 
µIE SOP.ET-TYPE ECONOMY 
The Less~Than Command Economy 
the d.~$c~:lpt,ioii·of any pa~t1i,cula~ ecoQQUly requires qualifications 
and ~es~r1c~1ons · to, q.~UQ.ea~.e- $t .. explicitly from the gene~al models 
employed ~be.o~•ttcaJ.iy but a~ldom.encountered in -pllWe foxm ;ln reality. 
In all ec.o,n,Qqµ.c; ·· ay~tems • ~be basie problq -is tb• $lloQa1l1.on of scarce 
1 
means amoqg ~QDl~~til)g e.11d-, .;for. ~be achievElli\mit_ a..#tmaximum. re~ults. 
The s.olu~i.Qii of -t~t~ b4si~ P.f.Joblem d.efines th~ fUJ1~t1oxis 9f an e~nemy 
a~4 tll.~ -~~h9.d· by, .whl~b·.t1',~se _flU;l~iiQM a~e pe~tormed,. ~h$ ban.a· func-
~to» <>.f .4.~ e~~n•y .t~. to. foi-ge and ma:J.ntai.n the bo~ds wh~ch gua-,:SJ).tee 
tqe ~a~e~ia~ s~iviv~i of socte~y by pe~fo~ng two related t•sks; 
.. ;- . 
1, Ot&AAi~•~~~n of a .,-stem for p~odµ.e~ goods aJld 
2 •.. J@~~bl.~~eJ.tt:. of·• s1s~~ of dis~~1-bµtiq• of. tbe 
2 tf.1li~~ Qf p~oductip~ SlQ~ng tt• OW!l m~~s, 
G@AW88 H~.QP~da th~se ge~8'al.t~slts ~~~o-• more pre~ise l1.$tj.pg of 
~«.v•n fuJ.ie t;~QQS .. wbtcq. · •qs 1: be . perfo~,d by aJiy eeoJl.qmy • ind~p8Jld.ptly 
of.! ti.- soci..o-ecpliQmie s1etezn t~t tdgh~ be chosea, These sewea fwic~lons 
areJ 
' . ' 1aeoi:-ge N, Balm, Bcpnomic Systems,. (New Yoi:-k, 1960). P• 11, 
. . .. ' ' - - . . ~ ; 
2Robert L. lleilbreiier., !h! Makin,8 of Bcoilomic So,ciety, (Englewed 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962), pp, 4-S. · · · 
s 
1. Deciding~ is going t_o be produced·._ 
2. Deciding .B!:!!!_ to produce. the commodities on whose prodµc-. 
tion we have decided. 
3. Setting aside part of the productive resources for 
capital goods production. 
4 • Solving Pl'Qblems . (1) through -(3) so that all the inter-
dependent :production processes are properly balanced. 
5. ·Ensurins·"full" use· of the avai-lable resource$, particu-
larly· of -~he labox- supply •.. 
6.· Distrib~ting the -total product of the social econ~y. 
7. Motivating the human element in the productive process 
to do -_the. right things_ a~ the right time. 3 
6 
Economies run_-by tradition, coumum.d, and the mark~t- are t.he gene~al 
types of systems. by --whicq. thee~· economiq -task$: are peri.orm~. The 
Russian- economy incorporates CODP8Ild, traclition, and the market in 
it is a less-than-absol~te-command economy. A command economy, as 
defined by.Gregory G;rossman, is aQ. economy in which the individual 
firms .produce and.~- resources· primarily by virtue of aped.fie 
directives (commands, targets) from some higher authorities; tbus. in 
a command economy, the firms have 11.ttle autonomy, and the system -._a 
whole is Di.atively little decentralized. or relatively c~tral1.zed, 
compared to a urket economy.4 Grossman, takiag into considerad,on the 
3&alm,.pp. 13-.14. 
4areaory ~ro88ql811, "Notes for a ~eory of the Commau.d Economy," 
Comparative Bcoaomic, Systems, ed. Morris Bornstein., (Homewood, Illinois, 
1965), P• 139. . 
7 
autonomy of ·the firm and the degre9: of centralization involved; def1.nes 
a less-than-absolute-command economy as an economy in which basic 
decisions regar~ing the allocation of resources are made.by the central 
planners who respond to broad policy:goals laid down" by·the" political 
leadership~ but who formulate their directives on the basis of informa-
tion supplied by subordinate operational and supervisory organs. 5 The 
Soviet economy in practitte conforms more closely to Grossman's less-· 
than-absolute-command economy tbau·it does to an absolut-e co1i1Diand 
economy'in that·Soviet firms have some-degree of ·autonomy in'their· 
actions and every det·a11 of economic activity is n:ot decided by the 
planning'authotity. 
In addition · to the ··characteri§Cics· . of a less~thail~al>solute-command 
economy, a·description of -the workings of the Russian economy must in-
clude' as ,a. framework a picture of< the; so·c1ial:lst society 1'through ~-which 
it operates ... 1n--a general .sense, ,·a socialist society is characterized 
by an institutional~- -in 'ithich. the control over means of production 
and over produ·ctior1 itself is vested in a central authority. 6 This 
central'authority·may be infotmed·of the interests of society arbitrar-
ily by ,a "Party-Priesthood'! or democratically by vote, <Jr by any combina-
tion :between· these two ·exc~emea. The various compromises between these 
two ·extremes encountered in the··a-cfual operation of socialist economies 
give rise to "mixed" socialism in which both public and private spheres 
of influence operate. somehow a 1111-ture of -the state preference function 
'JI 
s Ibid., p. 140. 
6Joaeph A. S<ihU1Upeter, C.p1.talism, Socialism and Democracy, 
(New York, 1950), p. 167. 
8 
and the syst~ of individqal preference functi9ns must be achieved on 
7 the basis of a dual valuation sys~em. Halm states th$~ '.'in p,;actice 
all economic systems a~e 'mixed' in the sense that the predominantly 
free systems contain elements of p~anning and that the plaQned systems 
make use of monetary incen~~v~s ~d of monetary .accounting procedures. 
However, economic literature discusses undex: the name of .mixed sys.tems 
specifically economie~ . (~eal or po.tential) which combine. the features 
of fre~ consumers' .and occupational choices wi~h.government qwnership 
o~, at least •. the '~t:t"ategic' industries, and a fair ~ount_ of .central 
8 planning,'.' . Tbe d~gree ~o wh~ch freedQJD .and autonomy o~ pr.od':lctiqn. are 
mixed. with .. social ownershi.p -~~ c~t.~ali.za~ion o_f. au~ority aubdi~ides 
socialism intQ mo~e spec~al~zed categories. The Russian form of 
social,ism · i~ a speci~ .c~t~gory.: . 
Althougl) it is grounded. in traditional Marxist theory, presen-t 
Russian soci:,alism may be described as "mixed" in tha~ all ~e~s.0£ 
production ~re not owned or conti;olled. by the State •. Tllere .are .,re.as 
of the eco~omy ~-which private own~,;ship and autonomy of activi~y 
occur, and this rem~ves to so,ne degree the Sovi~t practice tr01;11 "pure" 
so~ialism. ileQ Nove. d~videq the Sc:,viet economy into .~he following 
spher~s: s.t;ate enterprises, non-agricultural co-operative e:nterprises, 
9 
coll~ctive farms; and private. sector. The private sector is COJIIPO&ed 
7Jan Dr~owslti, "The E~on~i~ Theory of Socialism: A Suggestion 
for Reconsideration," Comparative Economic Systems, ed. Morris Born-
stein, (Homewood, Illinois, 1965) PP• 123-124. 
8 Balm, P• 21~ 
9Alec Nove, .I!:!!, Soviet Economy. (New York, 1965), P• 27. 
9 
of small agricultural hahdings, ·crafts, services. the arts, and small 
shops; but the largest private-sector ie the Russian labour force it-
self.: Free occupational,choice exists generally and labour is allocated 
in response to money ·wage d-ifferentials determined by the State for 
incentive and allocation purposes. The existence of this private sec-
tor in the Soviet system is .one example of the ''mixed" nature of Russian 
socialism and the less-than-absolute-command economy. However, even 
within the state-owned sector, control of resources is not absolute~ 
Despite the fact that,resource allocation-is subject to ·arbitrary 
central decisions and.some·fifteen hundred materials are.classified 
as critical and are allocated closely, .some of 'the less cr.itical ·items 
10 
are not scrutinized so closely.. -· · ·1 • r - . '. · 
Another manifestation of the "mixed" nature of the Russian system 
is the existence of some:fraedom aud·autonomy of-action on the·pa1rt of 
plant managers in Soviet industry. ·A state enterprise definitionally 
belongs to .the state, but the state does not direct every detail of 
the ecouomic activity of the enterprise. Nova refers to this mi.~ture 
of stat, ... nd,~dtvidual contirol as a ~omple¥ interactton·betweeu the 
planuei:-admin~st:r:ators on th~ ,one hand. and the productive enterprises 
12 
on the -othex, ·The entereiisa d:11:ector or. manager shares to some 
degree the decision makiDg autho~ity of the.planners; the application 
· !6f:i--rmit'3rial allocation :by .a. plant manager baa some illiluence upon 
t.he :process.of.distributing.the commodity in question -even with a 
10 
. &obert w. Campbell, Soylec Bconomic Power, (Boston, 2nd ed., 
1966), P• 4$. 
' 
1
~ove, p.· 39~ 
system of highly centralized supply. The manager also maintains the 
profit and loss accounts of the enterprise with almost complete 
' 
10 
autonomy in the use of the enterprise fund. These autonomous activities 
on the part of the plant managers indicate something lees than complete 
state control of the individual enterprise. 
And finally, the distribution of the product of the economy is 
achieved by a mixture of state and private functions. The distribution 
of intermediate products among different industries for further produc-
tion is exclusively within the realm of state control; however, some 
products and resources, not defined as critical by the state, .are 
transferred between the various firms of an industry by the individual 
,1 
plant managers. And, in the consumer sector, distribution of the final 
·, 
product is prd:vately controlled by the mechanism of consumer demand, 
, ,J t· .. -l_ '" .. :·.. ). ~ ... _ - - l • -.. : .. ~ ' .. -: • 
but the composition and quantity of this final product are determined 
/' .. ·• • ·:· • ., , ; ' • f. • ,,,. .- '\ • .. ~ ' • ~ -• 
by the state. In short, consumers are free to spend or save their 
money incomes as they wish on goods· supplied by the state in quantities 
fixed by the state. 
r '•, r • r' .. 
Describing the Russian economy in tems of a "mixed" socialist 
I. • .' • ' ~ 
society.characterized by command does not complete the description. 
The final facet is planning. Planning is the means of subjecting the 
I 
economy of a nation to the direction of conscious human will. Economic 
planning is an essential feature of socialism, and Russian socialism 
is ~o exception. Russia, as a socialist society, is definitely commit-
ted to planning to achieve predetermined goals. However, before 
discuas~ng planning as the met~od by which these goals are achieved, 
a brie.f ·.1:eview of these economic goals is presented. 
The Goals- of the Soviet Union 
This thesis will not deal with sucb ideological goals as the 
"withering away of the State." establishment of the pure Communist 
. ' 
State, etc., but rather with the primary task of the Soviet economy 
which is the establishment and perpetuation of a Russian Socialist 
. 12 
State. It was not completely clear to the Bolshevik leaders imme-
11 
diately after the October Revolution of 1917 that their survival 
depended on large-scale industrialization, but by the middle twenties, 
there was general agreement that the successful maintenance of the 
. 13 
Soviet State required industrialization and economic growth. And 
' ' I . ' . ~ I 1 ; '. ' ; . . • . 
since the establishment of this basic goal in the 192o•s, the Party 
,_ 
leadership has been virtually obsessed with achieving rapid indus-
trialization and econo~ei~ gr,owth. '.'. 
Given the backward condition of both agriculture and industry in 
Russia in the early years of the -:Cmmiro;ti§::5 ·regime, the Party leader-
ship's obsession with rapid growth and inchlstrialization necessitated 
.. 
at least two secondary goals of a complementary nature. Gr0t4h and 
industrialization implied increased agricultural ·production as a 
prerequisite for industrializatiQn or military expansion, and this 
increased agricultural production was attained through collectill&atiou 
of agriculture. This collectivisation of agriculture and the subsequent 
sacrifices imposed on the peasantry in turn called for the second 
requisite of highly centralized control of the economy. Having achieved 
12oskar La-,:ige, "The Role of Planning in Socialist Bconomy, ". 
cza5ative EcOllomiC Sxet&lllf!, ed. Mon-is Bornatein, (Homewood, Illinois, 
~!!.; 1 ) , p. 199. •' 
13 Campbell, p. 12. 
12 
the collectivization of agriculture and the solidification of.economic 
control unde~ ~ dic~atorQhip, the-Soviet :economy.moved toward the 
fulfillment of its basic objective. Campbell.describes.the Soviet 
economy as a totalitarianism harnessed to the task of rapid industriali-
zation and economi_c growth.1~ . This b4sic..-:goal. of rapid. growth .haE;J been 
institutionaliz~d i~ th~ s~ogan "to overtalc~ .and. sur_pass .the capital-
istic count.ries" and has become a genera~ly _accept-ed ,part of .the 
15 Russian economic environment. 
With this d~scriP.tioµ of the bas~c goals of the SQviet economy. 
planning as th~ method of .achieving these goals is_.cons~d~red. But ·a 
consideration of plans .and goals,and t:heir achi~:vement must be~ with 
·Th~ Piann:l.ng Hierarchy 
The Soviet ~lanning structur(! is destgn,ed to attain an op~um 
level of information transfer £ran the ~miest ~o the high~t organic 
unit and tq use this in£ opnati_on . to f or,nQ.late, as weU a.s to iulj ust 
the plans •. Since all tndQs~~iea, sec~ors, .and region~ ha~~ indigenous 
p.eculiarities,. . the pla~ingJ structure is. not rigidly r.estricted to any 
constant form. and. there are many variation.a wi~in ,the lower ~~s 
of the. organizations. With this qualif~cat~on in m.ind, a geQeral 
16 description of the planning bierarchy_~s.possible. 
14campbetl, p.a. 
15 . Ibid •. , p. ·26. 
16 . See Appendix. 
13 
At the apex of the planning pyramid is the USSR Government, - for 
all practical purposes, the Central Executive Committee of the Commu-
nist Party. In March, 1963, a new supreme central organ was created:· 
The Supreme Council of National Economy. This council operates as 
liaison between.the actual planning organ1.zations and the Party; it 
coordinates the ~oordinators. The first economic organ is actua1ly 
a dual body which-replaced the Council of Ministers in the planning 
reform of 1957, and is compoaed·of the Gosplan and.the USSR Sov-
narkho~~w17 This division of the central planning authority is based 
on functiou, with the Gosplan formulating long-term-plans and the USSR 
Sovnarkhoz illlpleinenting the short-term plan. The planning reform of 
1957 changed the structural emphasis"'.from minlsterialdivisions·to 
regional or territorial groupings, and in 1961 this was strengthened 
by the formation of eighteen-"big planning regions" wliich were to aid 
Gosplan in constructing long-term plans extending-beyond the limits 
of regional divisions. 18 Immediately under these super-regions** e~re 
are the Republican Governments, (Republic of the Ukraine, Republic of 
Georgia, Republic of Belorussia,.etc.) ·These republican governments 
contain a Republican Gosplan which duplicates for the regional economy 
the role performed by Gosplan at the national level. The Republican 
Gosplan drafts its own plan to include all industrial activity in its 
region, allocates most of the materials within the republic,** controls 
* Sovnarkhoza economic council (plural: Sovnarkhozy). 
17 BQve, p. 67. 
18 Ibid., P• 79. 
** Italics mine. 
*** Allocation of critical materials is controlled by Gosplan. 
14 
local industry through the oblasti,* and supervises its sovnarkhozy 
(regional economic councils). The regional sovnarkhozy parallel the 
function of the USSR Sovnarkboz on a smaller scale by implementing the 
regional plan. This implementation entails actual detailed control of 
the enterprise by appointing~ dismissing enterprise managers, 
supervising the fulfillment of the plan, and encouraging'new techniques 
and specialization. in addition to control of the enterprise, the 
regional sovnarkhozy also initiate the first step of.the planning· 
J 
process by constructing proposed plans for each ·'enterprise and forwarJ-
ing them to the republic Gosplans for perusal and aggregation. Beneath 
the regionai sovnarkhoz.level, industry is divided into sector depart-
ments to facilitate gathering information from similar enterprises from 
which to dra~ the proposed plan. And finally, the sector departments 
~'S'ists t of the various individual enterprises _.1,.9 
This description of the·vertical structure of the planning organiza-
tion is iiot ~omplei:e.with~utreference to the control hierarchy which 
parallels the.formal planning structure at every level. For the sake 
of brevity, the.mech~isms of control will be mentioned en passant. 
Corresponding to every level of planning organization, there is a 
horizontal relationship with an equivalent Party organ.which acts as a 
check and balance on the actions of the planning unit. And in addition 
to the Party, there is the added control of the financial institutions 
and statistical agencies which control the accounting of all financial 
* Oblast: local industry ·council or administrative group. 
(Plural: oblasti). 
19 Ibid., pp. 67-81. 
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transfers and transactions:and the compilation of -all operational data 
respectively. 
The Mechanics of Plan Formulation 
In outlining the planning structure and the functions of the vari-
ous units, from the central organ ·of the Communist Party to the indivi-
dual firm, reference was made to plans and to proposed plans. A 
clarification of these terms·necessitates a brief resume of the creation 
of a plan~ The procedure by which a plan is created was implied in 
defining the functions of the different planning organizations, but the 
explicit process·of.planning has its origins at both extremes of the· 
chain-of-command •. 
The Party priesthood, divine interpreters of the Communist ideology, 
from the commanding heights of the'Central·Executive Committee dedide the 
long-range objectives of policy or goals for the entire economy; but far 
removed'froni·the titanomachy of the Kremlin, a plant manager in the Ural 
Mountains submits the operational data of his firm to the sector depart-
ment to which his plant has been assigned. The mechanism by which.these 
two entities are united is the plan. Detailed information about current 
plan fulfillment. inputs used, and outputs obtained is forwarded from 
the enterprise to the sector department, and then to the regional 
sovnarkhozy. The regional sovnarkhozy incorporate all the information 
they receive into a regional plan which is sent to the Republican 
Gosplan for amalgamation and coordination with plans of the other 
regional sovnarkhozy. The information is passed through the entire 
hierarchy with additional revision and aggregation at each ensuing 
16 
level until it reaches Gosplan. At this point in its development, the 
plan is a proposed plan and has not been approved for actual implementa-
tion. The Gosplan combines Party directives translated to it by the 
Supreme Council of National Economy with the proposed plans based on 
aggregated operational information received from the Republic Govern-
ments and by making projections attempts to reconcile Party objectives 
and actual capacity in a Seven Year Plan. Now, having established the 
targets with a long range plan, the implementation of these targets is 
planned by the USSR Sovnarkhoz in the form of one year plans, with 
target$ or quotas usually divided into quarters. These short term plans 
are then transmitted back down. the chain of organizations and precipi-
tate a period of further information transfer and pseudo-arbitration. 
And after revision and resubmission, the plan is approved by the~-
plan. But approval and ratification do not render the plans final in 
: - •T O • -: ' • 
the strictest sense of the word; because even during the course of 
operation t;he. pl~~ .ar, revised ~d. changed by d~_rectives ,to. compensate 
for unforseen contige~cies, either operational or ideological. 
So we find the targets of the economy outlined in the formulation 
of the long-run plan (three to seven years), but achieved and evaluated 
20 in the fulfillment of the short-tan plan (one year or less). And it 
is here, in the area of actual implementation and subsequent evalua-
tion of the plan th:a.t. t~e p;roblems associated with planning arise• 
Since plans are drafted to achieve targEIB and goals, an evaluation of 
the success achieved by the pl4Ul relative to these targets and goals 
20
stanisiaw Wellisz, The Economies of the Soviet Bloc, (New York, 
1964), PP• 99-100. 
must be attempted. For such an evaluation, the Soviet system uses a 
variety of success indicators. 
The Success Indicators 
17 
The Soviet system uses many success indicators to evaluate the 
different aspects of.plant operation in meeting the targets prescribed 
by the plan. The primary objective of the enterprise is to fulfill or 
over-fulfill the output target stated in the plan; consequently, plan 
fulfillment is orie of the most important indicators. But in addition 
to plan· fulfillment, other indicators such as labour productivity, cost 
reduction, economy of scarce materials, wage funds, innovation, and 
profits may be used. ~ ,. .. j 
As. these various indicators are discussed separately in terms of 
their respectiie~advafitag~s;and' disad~antages~-it·becomes :obvious.that 
.!!!.~, the indicators are not mutually inclusive and are, in fact, 
' ' 
contradictory in some degree. Complying with.the multi-target indica-
tors under the:constraints and' shortages associated with his particular 
circumstance becomes: the essence of the manager's quandry. 
Soviet planners consider.plan fulfillment in physical terms the 
most obvious auecess indicator, so whether at the enterprise, sector, 
or regional levei~ ·.the primary task c,f the· director is to fulfill, and 
if possible, to over~fulfill the output plan. This output target which 
the manager attempts to fulfill is expressed in some ktnd of physical 
measure or when· physical measure is impossible, then in value (rubles 
of gross output). It is this concept of physical measure which presents 
one of the problems in the evaluation of plan fulfillment as a success 
indicator. 
18 
Grossman refers to this problem of physical measure as one of 
definition or grossness. 21 The crux of this problem lies in the fact 
that the target for the·firm is stated.in terms of gross product 
rather than net contribution to the national product. An example of 
the difficulty associated wit~ the use of physical measure is.the 
tendency of the individual managers to choose_production processes 
which are material-intensive to facilitat~--meeting their target 
quotas. Despite the fact that products may have more than one physical 
dimension, the intrepid-managers will arrange their production to favor 
that measure chosen-by the plan in an attempt to meet their quotas 
easier. The following example is revealing Qf the practices of 
managers to adjust their production process to the measure in which 
the plan targ~t is stated. 
If, for instance, ~oofing mat~rial is measu~ed ~P tons rather 
than square meters, the manager will make his roofing material as 
heavy as possible •. Conversely, if the unit Qf measure.is squ•re 111eters 
rather than tons, the manager will have the roofing material rolled as 
thinly as possible so as to produce the greatest surface area. And 
even if the plan expressed output.targets in ruble value rather than 
physical measures, the manager simply chooses the most expensive 
material inputs possible with which to fabricate the roofing material 
with little regard to quantity produced. A humorous example of the 
22 problem of grossness appeared iln the journal Krokodil as a cartoon. 
The cartoon showed a factory which had fulfilled its enti~e month's 
21 Grossman, P• 144. 
2
~ove, pp. 163-64. 
output program for nails by manufacturing one gigantic nail, and the 
nail was so large it filled the whole length of the workshop. 
19 
Another problem arising from the use of physical measures is the· 
fact that quotas are often interpreted to include unfinished work at 
the end of a plan period as part of the gross output. The result is 
that there is often an enormous amount of in-process material at the 
end of the plan period. Within the industries producing intermediate 
goods for further production another phenomenon of grossness occurred. 
Production is set to the largest tolerance so the intermediate product 
will have the greatest gross weight. An example of this problem is 
found in tool casting industries. In this._ case, the directors of the 
foundries manage_ to have the castings _poured so that_the greatest 
amount of slag and roughage is left on the casting. Subsequently, the 
gross output target expressed in weight is achieved with fewer castings. 
In the next production process of machining the casting, the excess 
material w~ich must be tooled. aw~y not only _-FO~titutes a .waste, _but 
the extra time and .. energy expended by the machinist is wasted as well. 
In addition to the waste involved in the managers' preference for 
material-intensive products induce~ by the use of quotas expressed in 
physical terms, another pro~lem having to do with the composition of 
the ~ggregate is oft~n observed. When targets are set 1n terms of 
gross output, no matter how detailed the plan may be, there is usually 
some aggregation of sub-commodities, with the com~osition of the mix 
left to the discretion of the individual managers. In these cases. the 
managers determine the proportions of the sub-commodities within the 
aggregate on the basis of their own convenience and particular 
20 
circumstance with little-consideration being given to the later users 
of the product. An example of this difficulty is found in the produc-
tion of screws and nails in which production decisions as to size and 
type are more compatible with plan fulfillment in the aggregate than· 
with the needs of the consuming sector. This results in imbalance 
among the sub-commodities-of an aggregate even'though the aggregate 
may meet with the target prescribed by the plan. -Shortages and sur-
pluses of some sub-commodities are the obvious result. 
Measure of targets in physical units is not the only problem 
associated with the use of plan fulfillment as a success indicator. 
The integrity of the individual plant managers may be affected by the 
fact that meeting or even exceeding the quota determines their bonus 
for the plan petmod. As this discussion has already indicated, the 
manager helps make the plan by submitting -his production data and 
expected future req11irements to his superiors in the sector department 
to which· his plant is· subordinated. Nove describes the result as a 
penalty for honesty and a reward for deceit in that an understatement 
of capacity and potential by the managers in constructing their part of 
theiplan often leads to their receiving a less demanding plan than the 
managers who report their data honestly. 23 In effect, managers try to 
construct a plan which will be easy to fulfill or even over-fulfill. 
This tendency is sometimes carried over to the intermediate levels of 
the planning organ. A regional or republican planning authority may be 
just as interested in being able to report an over-fulfilled plan as is 
23 Ibid., P• 162. 
the individual manager, and consequently, ·tolerate understatement of 
potentials and hidden capacity via the manager-reports.· 
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But the integrity of ·the managers is not-the only thing affected 
by plan fulfillment as a success indicator. Another problem arises·in 
the influence of the calendar on· economic activity. Plan fulfillment 
and target. dates have produced a phenomenon in Soviet industry ade-
quately described by the word. ·"storming. 1124 This practice is typified 
by a last minute, mad rush to complete the plan in the·last days of the 
allotted time, followed by a disorganized period of slack production 
after the target is met. Thia practice may not be necessarily unique· 
to a planned economy, but may have its origins in a natural human bent 
to procrastination, or the traditional peas·ant'. orientation· ·to short 
frenzied growing seasons followed by lazy winter months of inactivity; 
but regardless of ,its origj.n or the fact that this problem may be· found 
in capitalist economies, ·it nevertheless· exists in the Soviet economy 
and should be considered as a problem of the system. 
Labour productivity as an indicator is related to the problems 
associated with the grossness of physical measure. Changes in labour 
productivity are subject to distortion when computed relative to the 
gross output figures where these figures are determined by the most 
material-intensive combinations available. The roofing material example 
previously cited will be useful in expanding this statement. If a fac-
tory with a labour force of fifty workers produced fifty tons of roofing 
material which was highly material-intensive, then productivity per wokker 
24 Ibid., P• 167. 
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measured in terms of gross output would be greater than labour produc-
tivity of fifty workers in a similar plant which had produced the same 
surface area of roofing material, but with lighter materia~s having a 
gross weight of twenty-five tons. Thus, plant managers find that they 
can increase labour productivity relative to gross output by producing 
a rnJnaterial-intensive gross output •. But the labour productivity indi-
cator, in such a case, is contradictory to other success indicators 
such as a cost of production· indicator or one expressed in terms of 
materials. 
The plant manager is often faced with the decision of satisfying 
his gross output target byming material-intensive production methods 
and sacrificing cost of production and economy of materials, ·or of 
reducing his costs of production and economizing on inputs at the 
expense of a hig-h score.!!,· such ,indicators as _gross outpu~. However, 
emphasis on cost of production and economy of materials carries with 
it the .~ete' of deterring=quality improvements·in the.product and 
discouraging innovation. Attention to these two indicators by-the 
managers usually results in.low quality outputs and in some cases even 
appreciable alteration of the design of the product itself. But. the 
emphasis of the individual managers will reflect the particular 
revealed preferences of his planning superiors, and the manager will-
b~ sure to give primary attention to those indicators which are rated 
higher by his superiors than those which are considered marginal. 
Furthermore, of all the Soviet success indicators, profit is the least 
important to the planners and consequently to the managers. 
Profit as an indicator is given positive consideration if it is 
incidental to a teduction of the cost of production target, but does not 
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carry the negative connotations associated with losses in that many 
planned targets openly necessitate a loss. These planned losses are 
mainly the result of prices fixed to barely cover average costs of 
the industry. If prices cover the costs of the average firm, then 
those firms with costs above this average face an unavoidable loss 
and firms with costs below the average appreciate a profit. Such 
planned losses are not considered a failure by the planning authority, 
but failure to meet the output quota would not be viewed with eq~al 
disinterest. 
This negative presentation of the success indicator system should 
not be interpreted to iniply.that'Soviet industry.is rendered wasteful, 
inefficient, and nearly paralyzed by this mechanism. These problems 
are listed to point ·1out the degree to which these indicators represent 
the absence of economic rationality. Economic rationality in a Soviet-
type system implies the most efficient use of resources to achieve the 
politically determined ends. Prybyla strips this concept of political. 
prejudice and dogmatic emotionalism by stating that economic rationality 
is not a question of the rationality of the preferences, but rather, of 
the most rational manner of expressing such preferences and the most 
efficient way of achieving·them. This is an admonition to the student 
of systems not to color his considerations with the moral and ethical 
implications of the goals of any system he studies, but to apply the 
elements of economic theory to the system and its methods of achieving 
its goals whether these goals conform to his own value judgements or 
not. So with this admonition in mind, rational planning is considered. 
25 Jan·s. Prybyla, "The Quest for Economic Rationality in the 
Soviet Bloc," Social Research, (Vol. 30, Sept. 1963), p. 16. 
Rational planning has two main aspects: coordination and effi-
ciency. Coordination ensures internal consistency and balance ampng 
the actions of producers and consumers; and efficiency requires that 
producers follow courses of action which use the smallest possible 
26 input of resources to obtain the reguired output. However, before 
applying the two concepts of.coordination and efficiency to Soviet 
planning, a brief development.· of the role of rationality in Soviet 
planning will be presented. 
The Background of Rationality in Soviet Planning 
24 
When the Bolsheviks gained control of Russia in the Revolution of 
1917, they att.empted an,.immediate.application of Socialism and central 
planning to a system previously characterized by a free market economy. 
The ensuing ·period, -referred ·;to as "war communiS1D;," was marked by 
economic chaos and failure·. . "War Communism" conQtituted· an attempt, 
which proved premature, .to realize the Party's stated ideological goals 
of a pure socialist .state principally through two measures: (1) Requi-
sition of grain froni- the agricultural sector and (2) nationalization of 
all major industries without compensation. 27 The result of this policy 
was embittered resistance on the part of the peasantry and inability of 
the workers to operate the nationalized factories in the absence of 
their former owners and managers. During this period of "war communism" 
in the spring and summer of 1918, economic directives issued from the 
central organs of the Party exemplified the Jacobin tradition which 
26 Campbell, p. 83. 
27Donald w. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago, 2nd ed., 
1966), PP• 164-65. 
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brought the Bolsheviks to power: the end justifies the means. The 
implication of this attitude of Party leaders to the economy indicated 
an almost total absence of rationality in planning and contributed to 
the almost complete suspension of economic activity. But other forces 
played a part 11:1 weakening the Russian economy at this point, for with 
their revolution, the Bolsheviks bad not inherited a strong, well 
ordered economy. Russia's participation in World War I under the inept 
autocracy of Czar Nicholas II bad almost completely destroyed public 
faith in the autocracy and the central bureaucracy. The economy was 
severely strained t~.meet the mi~it~ry. req~irem~nts of a modern war ris-
a-vis with al!- industri~l en~i~y of .. the mag~it~de _.of_ the Austro-German 
coalition. The intervening period between the February and October 
Revolutions is referred to as the Duma or Provisional Government 
period (March 15 to November 7, 1917). 28 This brief attempt at 
constituent control brought the deadly combination of inactivity linked 
with inability; so when the Bolsheviks assumed leadership on November 8, 
1917, very few cour~es of action they could have initiated could have 
29 
made things any worse. - But they did manage to intensify the economic 
confusion by the-implementation of "war communism." The Civil War 
following the.revolution and the desperate effort of the Bolsheviks to 
maintain their control compounded the detrimental economic effects of 
the "war communism" period. 
The retreat from "war communism" into the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
re-established the mechanism of the market as an element of economic 
28 Ibid., PP• 126, 149. 
29 Ibid., p. 149. 
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policy by allowing a partial restoration of a free· trade for the 
peasants and small-scale ·enterprises. The· ·private sector of the 
economy was reconstituted with the State main:tainirig· the "commanding 
heights" of industry. With this approach, -the recovery of the -economy 
rapidly approached pre-war levels of production. This compromise with 
capitalism, although rat·ionalized by Lenin as a temporary necessity to 
save the economy·, was interpre·ted by some party leaders as a· betrayal 
of the revolutionary ideology, and this-dissent"ion within the Party 
gave rise to the Great Ind1i'strialization Debate·. 30 The resolution of 
this debate was to have a profound effect on.the future role of ration-
ality in Soviet planning. The: outcome of this contest ·was obvious with 
the solidification of party power by Joseph Stalin -in 1928, and the 
adoption of the first Five Year Plan in 1929. The future of ration-
ality in the Soviet system is·· summarized· tn Nove's ~stitt-ement, that 
given the nature·'of the regime,· of the economic tasks to be achieved, 
the hostility tff the· icieology · to· any ·talk o~ ·ec~nomic· ·-rationality," · 
the net effect was to keep·in being forms of economic organization 
designed to achieve-·rapid results irr priority sectors -by quantitative 
direction. 31 This conscious direction of economic activity by the 
planners ·to priotfty sectors of the economy ·rais·es the question of 
balancing and coordination. 
Coordination and Balancing 
The complex i:riter-relationships b~tween. economic magnitudes consti-
tute the essence of the balancing problem, and the solution has been 
30 
.Campbell, p. 12. 
3¾love, p. 155. 
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sought in using material balances relative to input-output relationships. 
Coordination in any economy requires adequate information to understand 
the issues involved and an inst-itutional setting which allows the 
planner to make the correct decision by utilizing this information. 
Grossman considers the primary concern of coordinative planning as 
material balancing by the most ~ttjfa,ur; method. This. balancing 
proRlem is rendered more difficult in the Soviet system by an endemic 
logic of haete.32 In practice the energies of Soviet planners are 
almost completely absorbed with attempts- to balance ·physical quantities 
with little regard fpr efficiency and alternative uses. 
Material balancing on an input-output -basis consists of a successive 
33 
approximation of aggregates.- Balancing and coordination in the upper 
echelons of the planning struct)jre deal with aggregates ·of a national 
magnitude and attempt to achieve consistency between the tasks outlined 
for the economy by long range.goals lmd ,the actual capacity of the 
ecou"my as dete.rmil;led .. by .last year' a pro.duction information mod~fi~d 
by a growth,coefficient. Thee~ nationally b~la,nced aggregates ·are sub-
divided and rebalanced as the plan follows the institutional structure 
down to the lower levels of· the economy until finally, at the regional 
Sovnarkhozy or sector level, the sector aggregates are balanced in terms 
of physical units of output and input for that specific product or 
product mix. This· .use of input-output relationships was rather crudely 
applied by Soviet planners in the beginning .and discrepancies in the 
plpnadngaladces were corrected by ~A2,£. directives which altered the 
32 Grossman, p. 142. 
33 Wellisz, p. 174. 
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plan in the direction of the priorities of the planners during the 
actual implementation of the plan., This method allowed for satisfac-
tory balance among the major areas of the national economy .. with the·· 
wastes and imbalances at the sector levels more than offset by the 
achievement of a papid growth rate:which was -the-primary objective of 
34 the planners. But this very growth rate proved to be the nemesis 
of rationality in Soviet planning. 
As this·burgeoning growth rate induced an industrial metamorphosis 
of the Soviet economy, the need for micro-balance, as well as macro-
balance, became apparent._:.'. As the economy grew, .. the obsession with 
growth by the planners, -'Could no longer· take precedence over solving 
the problems of wastes ·an:d· -imbalances· at the. sector,.. Ire.vela and the 
widening differential between the de:velopment of priority and non-
priority ··s·ectors·. ·. Serious·, cousi:derat1.on of micro-balance became a · 
rational necessity. This additional emphasis has resulted in an 
increasing interest ott the part -of Soviet planners in input-output 
calculations of the Leontief' ·type and the applicabil:l.ty of linear 
programming to short-term planning ·and capacity limitations to the 
points that old-fashioned bureaucrats are now working side by side 
with mathematically trained ·technicians.35 But incorporating rationality 
into Soviet planning by improving methods of balancing and coordination 
must be done efficiently. 
Efficiency and Pricing 
Efficiency in planning raises the questions of calculation and 
34 Campbell, P• 49. 
35weliisz, pp. 148-52. 
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allocation. In order to allocate a resource to its.most efficient use, 
an economic calculation must determine .this use to be more productive 
than that of any alternative use; or ·conversely, a resource should·not 
be allocated to any·use which is less productive than some other .alter-
native. Efficiency includes the necessity for-calculation which in turn 
relies on some commoll, measure,. such as prices. Consequently, a discus-
sion of efficiency in planning requires a description of the role of 
prices in the Soviet system and·the process by which these prices are 
determined. 
Bornstein describes prices in the Soviet economy as· a system of 
prices which is.manipulated by· the central authorities as one of· 
various instruments intended to· ·accomplish.-their planned goals,· and 
not an autonomous force determining production, resource allocation, 
36 
and consumption. These administer.ed p'rices are not what Schumpeter 
refers to as a co~fficient of economic choice, in that by paying a 
price for-any commodity, buyers show.a,preference for that.commodity· 
as compared with other commodities which they ·could also buy for the 
37 
same money. The Soviet·_view of prices. holds that it is wrong to 
attach scarcity prices to reproducible goods i.n that this merely 
confuses calculations·of real-cost, which, in the long run, will be 
determined not by relative scarcities but by the costs at which, when 
the planners so decide, the scarce commodity could be produced. And 
36Morris Borllf;ltein, "The Soviet Price System," Comparative Economic 
Systems, (Homewood, Illinois, 1965), p. 279. 
37Joaeph A. Scbumpeter, "Price as Coefficients of Choice," Capital-
!!!!., Market Socialism, and Central Planning, ed. Wayne A. Leeman, 
(Boston, 1963), p. 131. 
38 Nove, p. 292. 
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since this decision will be made.·by the planners and not based on the 
profit motive, there is no reason torreward anyone with extra income 
just because there is a temporary scarcity, ·but rather, these·scarce · 
commodities should be rationed until such time as the planning author-
ity is able to make their supply plent·iful· •. However, -while prices can 
be set to equate supply with demand·according to planner's preferences, 
these preferences cannot themselves be based on an independent calcula-
tion of opportunity costs, as reflected in·independently determined 
scarcity prices, since the scarcity.prices in use are themselves fixed 
on the basis of planners~ ·-preferences. With this description· of the 
Soviet attitude toward pricing, the discussion may be directed now to 
the various categories of prices and the rationale by which they are 
administered. 1· 
Soviet prices are classed by-Alec Nova as- reta~l, industrial, and 
agriculturai. 39 -Agricultural prices will becmitted from this discussion. 
State retail prices· eupposed1y, are fixed· with the aim of clearing,the · 
market· botli in aggregate 'terms and for each commodity. ~ Bri:efly·, the· 
rule for tbeaadministration of retail prices is to set these prices so 
that in purchasing .the total of goods made available, the consumers will 
just exhaust their total money incomes and so that the planned supply of 
each individual ·good just matches the expected demand for that good. 
This pricing process is referred to by Campbell as an attempt to achieve 
macro- and micro-balance in tbe market. 40 To aid the achievement of this 
balance, Soviet planners utilize a turnover tax which serves as a cushion 
39 Ibid., p. 135. 
40 Campbell, pp. 86-87. 
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to separate the retail prices paid by households and the·industrial 
prices received by producing enterprises and at the same time profides 
the planners with a convenient mechanism for altering consumer prices. 
without altering producer prices, correspondingly,· and vice versa.41 
Industrial prices are supposed to be based on the average cost·of 
production of all enterprises prmducing the commodity in question, 
plus a small profit margin, often defined.in Soviet textbooks as· 3-5 
42 per cent. However, 6ampbell points 9ut that in practice industll.£1 
prices have usually.departed considerably from the ·actual costs of 
production and customarily do not include any charg·es for X'ent or 
capital and seldom reflect the use value to the customer.~3 These 
disparities in industrial ,prices on, .. the: inter-firm<and .inter-industry 
level lead to less than perfect allocative decisions by the planners. 
All~cative efficiency requires_price parameters that Teflecttfairly 
accurately opportunity costs and social worth, but prices in the Soviet 
Union hav.e traditionaljy performed the function of head off:Lce account-
ing control over manag~rial behaviour. The difficulties of the price 
system are accentuated further by the existence of State subsidies and 
the subsequent variation between.profit and loss differentials within 
certain sectors and industries. This distortion of the calculated 
profitability of various industries has· effects on the allocation of 
capital to the.most productive use. 
The planners-may allocate·capital to ·the most productive user on 
41 Bornstein, p. 302. 
4
~ove, p. 136. 
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the basis of profitability calculations, but given the distortions and 
imperfections of the Soviet price system, this allocation may not_be 
the most efficient, but. the weaknesses of the pri~e system are.not the 
only problems encountered in cap·ital allocation. The rational alloca-
tion of capital by the Russian planners was originally thwarted by 
Marxian orthodogy itself. which, of course, d~es the productivity 
of capital. The Russian pianners circumvented_ this difficulty by 
44 
using the payoff period approach to capital allocation. In con-
sidering. different inve~tment pr.ojects, . they ask how long it will take 
for the .cost savings in the production process to recover the additional 
45 
capital. This is merely. a back_ .. d~or .in.tere_st rate expressed as a 
function of time rathe.r than the usual return to capital. However, 
even this. relatively_ rational ~e~hanism, 1of c~culation can not obviate 
the problem of determining a reasonable payoff period or of comparing 
opportunities in two different indus~ries which by nature of their 
operation are not eve~ remotely _similar in industrial activity or time 
needed for the activity. 
These problems associated with efficienc, and pricing, balance and 
coordination, and the success indicators are becoming more important to 
the planners as the Sovie·t economy grows in size and complexity. The 
more interdependence there is amang economic decisions and the more 
alternative choices available to the planners, the more difficult it 
becomes to provid~ the planners with information and rules which will 
44 Campbell, p. 58. 
45 Nove, p. 219. 
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· · · 46 , 
enable them to make a rational choice. According to Campbell, these 
weaknesses of the Soviet system·have become more serious ·and the tradi-
47 tional forms of planning have become obsolete as the economy bas.grown. 
Trends in Soviet Economic Thought 
These problems and their increasing severity have led Russian 
economists to investigate possible solutions, especially in the area of 
reforms in planning and administration. Consequently, a new controversy 
has arisen in Soviet economics which Goldman compares to the Great 
Industrialization Debate of the 1920's. 48 The death of Stalin in 1953 
opened the door to a revival of economic thought in Russia; however, as 
early as 1939, Kantorovicb published a work on linear programming, and 
49 Novozhilov was working along similar lines as early as ~946. Both 
men were concerned with using computers to establish prices for both 
factors of production and commodities which would supply a more adequate 
50 guide to choice between alternatives. Nemchinov tried to devise an 
acceptable compromise of the Novozhilov-Kantorovich ideas, but the 
efforts of E.G. Liberman to investigate plan making and administration 
and his proposals for reform are perhaps the best known of any of the 
participants in this new controversy. According to Goldman, the 
46 Campbell. p. 103. 
47Ibid., p. 104. 
48 Marshall 11 Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," 
Comparative Economic Systems: A Reader. (New York, 1964), p. 347. 
49 Nove, p. 290. 
SOibid., p. 291. 
Liberman proposals have become the focus of one of the most provaca-
tive and far-reaching discussions in Soviet economic thought. And 
the focus of the discussion of this thesis is now directed to the 
Liberman proposals. 
34 
'CHAPTER. III 
THE LIBERMAN PROPOSALS 
* In drafting his proposals, E.G. Liberman was primarily concerned 
with a reform of the Soviet economic administration which would allow a 
more effective use of the country's economic resources. His suggestions 
called for improvements in planning efficiency and operating-incentives 
with more emphasis on markets, prices and profit considerations. How-
ever, before turning to.the 'deveiopme~t of these proposals and the 
specific -suggestions··they contained, an' over-view·' of the general nature 
and intent of the proposals is'br!efly presented. : 
The basic intent of-· Liberman' s proposais is to provide more freedom 
for the plant manager, more intelligent use of resources, and accordingly 
1 
more efficiency through a reform of Soviet planning. Essentially, this 
reform calls for a decentralization of planning with the attendant ine 
2 
crease·in enterprise decision making based on the profit motive. This 
decentralization'must rely principally on an elimination of the system 
of concentrating on gross value of output and undue and excessive 
• Evsei Grigorievich Liberman is Chairman of the Department of 
Political Economy of the Kharkov Institute of Technology. 
1Goldman, p. 350. 
2 Nove, p. 233. 
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interference in the firm's .operation by superior agencies.3 According 
to Goldman, Liberman's sugg~stions for Soviet economic reform in the 
direction of decentralization and increased freedom for the firm outline 
. . 
three main goals: (1) to stimulate So~iet en~erprises and firms to seek 
higher output targets for themselves, (2) to ~ncourage the introduction 
of new technology and new products, and (3) to improve the quality of 
production. 4 These general elements contained in Liberman's proposals 
represent the end res~t of many years of attention given to the problems 
of planning by Liberman. 
On September 9, 1962, the Liberman proposals were published in 
Pravda, and for many western readers, this was.their first exposure to 
"new" 
' - '! -. 'r" •• :, ,.._ ~ • ' . .. "\, • .. • .... ' • 1 • "I .. ~' 
trends in Soviet e~t;,nomic :thpugQ_t •.. Howeve~, ~:t~is .was not the 
first time Liberman had advanced ideas of reform in the economics of 
. , . 
Soviet planning with.specific-reference·to the problems encountered at 
the firm level. As early as.195S, in an article to Voprosy Eknonmiki, 
Liberman urged that each enterprise ·should have ··a 'long-term economic 
perspective' on which it could rely, for five to seven years ahead, in 
terms of which its efficiency should be measured; such objective criteria 
of efficiency should be output relative.to basic and working capital, 
labor productivity, and profi·t.ability. S . Liberm.8n regarded a reform of 
this nature of vittal importance before firms would be able to consider 
long-term developmen.t or would be free from the distortions which arise 
from attempting 'to fulfill the ever changing plan indicators. Then 
3 Goldman, p, 348. 
4Ibid. 
5Nove, p. 246. 
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again in 1959, in an article to the Komm.unist, Liberman formulated 
proposals which were more far-reaching than those of 1962 in that be 
then advocated openly the dismantlement of the materials allocation 
system, while at the later date, he thought it best to keep silent on 
this point. 6 In the promulgation of all these proposals, including 
those of 1962, Liberman was primarily concerned with the situation of 
the individual industrial enterprise. 
In the opening statements of his 1962 proposal, Liberman summarized 
the problems faced by the individual enterprise: 
The present procedure of planning the work of enter-
prises stifles their initiative, does not permit the 
maximum utilization of production potentialities and 
the advantages of the new system of management,. and 
· does not ma1te enterprises interested in further · 
raising the efficiency ~f production. This is sug-
gested by countless facts, by statements of indus-
trial executives and scientists.7 
The 'present procedure of planning' to which Liberman referred was 
characterized by a large number of different plans and instructions 
handed down to the firm from above by different planning offices 
operating in many cases with imperfect information. These directives 
from above would prove restrictive enough to initiative i~ they were 
consistent with each other, but more often thannot, the criteria set 
forth in the various instructions ·were conflicting. Consequently, firms 
were forced to adjust th~ir productive activity and to choose di.ch 
elements of an inherently inconsistent plan tQ fulfill. Enterprise 
managers were motivated to bid low and understate their product:'.ve 
6 Nove, p. 248. 
7Evsei Orilgorievicb Liberman, "Planning Production and Standai:de of 
Long-Term Operation," Problems .2!, Economics, (Vol. fJB, Dec., 1962), p. 16. 
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potential in an etfort to influence their pl~ng superiors to g~ve 
them an easy plan, because even in a command economy, the top planners 
must receive information from below with which to formulate plans. In 
addition to the loss of effic~ency as~ociated ~th this tendency of 
managers to understate potentials, the system of rewards and penalties 
faced by managers in.attempting to fulfi~l planned targets often re-
sulted in the production of obsolete or inferior goods and a tendency 
to avoid innovation •.. In short, managers were motivated to fulfill the 
plans at any cost, regardless of quality, durability, and reliability of 
8 the output. It was the existence of -these induced !~efficiencies at 
the firm level which caused Liberman to suggest changes in the relation-
ship between the enterprise and the planning authority relative to 
instructions, indicators, autonomy, and incentives. 
Indicators and Autonomy 
The first point that Liberman makes in his proposals is that "only 
the key indices, the decisive .indices, should be handed_down to enter-
prises, whose directors would be given greater rights and opportunities 
for economic maneuvering within their scope. 119 The implication of this 
statement is that. the planning process should be improved in its efforts 
to achieve maximum output and efficiency through simplification of 
existing procedures. The.planning instructions from above should contain 
indices as to how much and. what kinds of outputs to produce, and, as the 
8A1ec Nove, "The Liberman Proposals," Survey, (London, April, 1963),c:: 
p. 113. 
9 Liberman, p. 16. 
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second basic assignment of the firm, fbe additional -index of profita-
bility of an enterpri·se must 'be handed·.·11own. · But, the enterprise 
should be given the right and ·obligation, independently and completely, 
to elaborate technical-production-financial plans on the basis of the 
output target planned for ·them 'from above.' The enterprise should 
construct its own labor, wages,· costs, ·and profit plans. Liberman 
justifies this simplificatioil' of the role of the central planners via 
increased autonomy on the part of·the firm with the statement: 
What is profitable to society as·a whole will also be 
profitable to each production collective, and on the 
other hand, what is wasteful from ·the standpoint of· 
publi.c interests will be extremely unprofitable to 
each enterprise.-10 · ·· ... : · · · 
This suggestion' for· decentralization ··with an increase. in .planning from 
below necessitates a clear criterion of ·efficiency to which managerial 
decisions would be related.-
Liberman describes his .. criterion of efficiency as the ''share-in-
the-income" principle.which·is realized in the form of a planned long-
11 term standard of profitability of production. This basic criterion 
of profits, expressed as a 'percentage:· of' the enterprises' capital, both 
fixed and circulating, is the essence of the Liberman plan. This basic 
index of profitability relative to the capital of the firm would be 
formulaaed by drawing up a standard scale of deductions from·profits for 
uniform groups of enterprises within each branch of industry, and these 
deductions from profit would be put at the disposal of the firm with 
the remaining profit collected by the state as revenue. 
lOibid., p. 17. 
11Ibid.' 
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Liberman illustrates this standard scale of deductions from p~ofits 
as a percentage of assets with an example using the machine-building 
industry. This table of deductions from profits is an approximation 
based on an analysis of date of the operation of 23 machine-building 
plants over a five-year period, with the scale of deductions expressed 
as a logarithmic function of profitability.12 The table is divided 
into seven columns showing the different intervals of profitability 
expressed as a percentage of assets. The financial reward or retained 
deduction from profit is listed in two parts. Row 1 shows the financial 
reward in percentage of funds which mJy be retained from the profit. 
Row 2 shows the additional reward which may be retained as a percentage 
of any profits exceeding the lower limit of the profitability interval. 
Liberman was careful to point out that the scale of deductions from 
profit available to the firm would increase, but would increase less 
. . -
than proportionately to profits. The larger part of the increase in 
! 
profits would go to the state and would benefit and not harm revenues. 13 
A hypothetical calculation using this scale of deductions for 
determining financial rewards at different levels of profitability for 
a machine-building plant may prove helpful at this point. With the 
initial assumption that a given machine~building plant is operating so 
that its profitability is 5.1 perceant of its total assets for a given 
quarter, let us also assume, for the sa~e of simplicity, that its total 
assets amount to 1000 rubles. The total profit tor this period of 
operation would be 51 rubles. Reading from Column 2 of Table 1, we see 
12Ibid. 
13tbid. 
TABLE I 
SCALE OP FINANCIAL REWARDS FOR ENTERPRISE DEPENDING UPON LEVEL OF PROP'ITABILITY14 
Financial Profita~ility (In Percent of Assets) 
Reward,· 
. (1} (2} , {31 (4) {5} ·{62 en 
. 0-5 s.1-10 10.1-20 ··-20.1-30 30.1-45 45.1-60 60-100 
(1) In Percent of -
Funds 
-
2.1 · 3.0~ 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.3 
.. ~ 
.. 
(2) Additional 
(in Percent of.Profits 
lxceed:lng the Lower 
Limit of the Interval)· 42.0 18.0 ·_· 9.0.- ',. 5.0 3.3 2.7 2.0 
14Liberman, p·. 18. 
J 
~ 
.... 
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that this firm is allowed a financial reward~of.21 rubles and that the 
remaining 30 rubles are received by the state.:as revenue. At this level 
of 5.1 percent profitability, no additional financial rewards are avail-
able to the firm, but now let us assume:·tbat ·nth the same asset base, 
the same firm is able to increase its profitability to 10 percent of 
its assets. Now the total profit of the firm :1.s:100 rubles. The 
initial financial reward of 21 rubles is available at this level of 
profitability as indicated by Row 1 of.the table, and there is also 
the additional reward to be calculated from the excess of profits over 
the lower limit of this pro~itability interval. This excess profit is 
49 rubles or 4.9 percent of the assets (the amount by which the profit 
of 100 rubles exceeded the profit of 51 rubles at the lower limit of 
this interval, i.e. 100 - 51 equals 49 or 10 percent - 5.1 percent 
equals 4.9 percent). The portion of this excess profit of 49 rubles 
- . ..' ....... .. 
which the firm may retain as an additional reward is indicated in 
Row 2 of Column 2 as 18 percent. Calculation of this amount indicates 
~ ' - .. • •: ' r • r . " -. . 
that the firm will receive an additional reward of 8.82 rubles and 
adding this amount to the initial reward of 21 rubles gives the firm 
a total of 29.82 rubles at the 10 percent profitability level. 
Now, one further step in this hypothetical case and the illustra-
tion will be complete. Assume the same firm with the same asset base 
increases its profitability to 10.1 percent of its assets. The financial 
reward of the firm at this level of ·profitability is 30 rubles as indi-
cated by Row 1, Column 3, and there is no excess profit over the lower 
limit of this interval upon which to make a calculation for additional 
reward. But it is important to note that this lower limit of the next 
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profitability interval yields a greateJ.:' financial reward than_d~d the 
highest limit of profitability in the prec~ed~ng interval. A brief 
tabular presentation of this hypothetical.calculation is shown.in the 
lmst~ugnth~lgv to clarify the relationship between -the upper aiid lower 
limits of each consecutive 111.terval. 
Profitability . Total:;· ·< . . Pinaitcial State 
(In Percent of Assets) Profit Reward Revenue 
5ol (Lower Limit) 51 r • 21 r. 30 r. 
. . 
10.0 (Upper Limit) 100 r. 29.82 r. 70.18 r. 
10.1 (Lower Limit) 101 r. 30 r. 71.r. 
Thus, at profitability levels of 5.1 percent, 10 percent, and 10.1 per-
. - ~ . 
cent, the firm received minancial rewards of 21, 29.82, and 30 rubles 
• j • ~ • ... 
respectively and the state received 30, 70.18, and 71 rubles respectivelyo 
. ..,·1' .. 
Liberman maintained that his index based on the profitability of 
• J 
each firm would make firms unconditionally interested in improving all 
production indices both in the process of elaborating the plan and in 
-~ ;. - .. 
the course of its fulfillment, and in so doing, obviate the necessity 
' ", ·: . 1S . .: . 
of handing down any other indices to the firms. In short, by tyJ-qg 
the incentive fund of the enterprise to the retained deductions from 
·' 
profits expressed as a percentage of assets, the incentive of managers 
to attain maximum output and efficiency would be achieved via the 
interest of the manager in his own pocketbook. 
· Incentives 
Liberman used profitability as a percentage of assets as the 
1
~Ibid. 
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underlying principle in providing incentives to managers •. He stipu-
lated the rule that deductions from profits placed at the disposal of 
an enterprise must be the single and sole source of payment of all 
types of financial rewards.16 ·The incentive fund would become the 
only source from which managers could finance decentralized investment 
and pay bonuses. Additionally, any sanctions levied against the £inn 
by superior planning authorities must also be paid from this incentive 
fund. Consequently,·the managers would be motivated to choose courses 
of productive action w~ch would yield .. the greatest net product in. 
relation to their capital assets. 
Liberman felt that.the enterprise itself knew its potential best, 
but at the same time, he was aware ~f : the problem of persuading enter-
prises to bid high and not understate their potential in drafting their 
part of the.plan. To.solve this.problem,·he conceived an ingenious 
deviee by which the-incentive fund 1 benefits less·from·overfulfilling 
17 than from fulfilling a given profits plan. This concept relates back 
to the fact that Liberman stipulated that the enterprise submit its 
complete plan to.include the profit plan. He states that "under the 
suggested system.of planning, an enterprise will receive deductions 
from profits based on the percentage of profitability included in the 
plan which the enterprise itself d~s.up. 018 - If the firm director 
draws up an ambitious p_lan and does uot achieve the planned level of 
profitability, then the deductions from profit will be computed on the 
16 Ibid., P• 18. 
17 Nove, p. 133. 
18 Liberman, p. 18. 
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actual profitability achieved,-but if the firm director draws up a 
plan which understates the actual profitability achieved, then the 
deductions are computed from the percentage of profitability stated in 
the plan. This does not actually restrain a tendency on the part of 
managers to attempt to overfulfill their plans, because the excess 
profit incurred would be subject to deductions for the use of the 
firm, but these deductions would be at the rate stipulated by the 
firm's own plan. But the most important point is that with this 
method, there is no advantage to be gained by understating potentials. 
Closely associated with the incentive to state potentials honestly 
in the plan formulated at the firm level, is the ~~£oto 
minimize production costs. Since profitability depends~on the direct 
reduction of production costs, firms would lose all desire to draw in 
additional labor power or use the most expensive materials-of produc-
tion. In fact, Liberman suggests that such an attempt to purchase in-
puts as cheaply as possible will influence the production decisions of 
19 
suppliers without any official instructions from above. With 
profitability expressed as a percentage of assets·, firms would find it 
unprofitable to obtain unnecessary equipment and excess capital invest-
ments both of which contr,bute to costs of production. 
Profitability would not only motivate the firm director to attempt 
to minimize costs· and maximize efficiency, but also to innovate. The· 
incentive to innovate requires some degree of security on the part of 
the innovator that the rules governing additions to the incentive fund 
will remain unchanged for a long enough period of time to enable the 
19 Ibid., p. 20. 
innovation to mature and contribute ·-to ·the .profitability·.of .the firm. 
Liberman makes this necessary-requirement clear-in his reference to 
the continuity of production and the need for·long-run stability in 
20 the profitability indices·. - There would be small incentive to 
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innovate new techniques or improve the quality of existing products 
if the costs incurred could not be recovered before the profitability 
indices were changed detrimentally. But despite the fact that Liber-
man insists that the profitability indices should remain constant for 
at least the same period of operation as a given set of wholesale 
prices, he admits the need for price changes associated with innova-
21 tion and product improvement. According to Liberman, if a product 
offers its user the possibility of additional applications, a corres-
ponding addition to its price should be established to increase the 
profitability of production and allow the firm to fully recoup the 
increase in outlays of labor and materials connected with improving 
22 the quality of the product. These price changes should be approved 
by the central authorities only after they have been mutually checked 
by enterprises on the basis of direct ties established between suppliers 
23 
and buyers. 
Liberman's proposal for planning production and establishing 
standards of long-term operation at the firm level based on the con-
cept of profitability is an attempt to improve the existing planning 
20Ibid., pp. 17, 18, and 20. 
21Ibid., PP• 17 and 20. 
22Ibid., p. 20. 
23Ibid. 
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procedure via simplification. According to Nave, the proposed scheme 
would free central planning from the task of detailed supervision of 
firms and from costly attempts to influence p~odbJtion not by economic 
24 but by administrative means. 
I . 
24 Nove, p. 114. 
.CHAPTER IV 
RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE LIBERMAN PROPOSALS 
The Liberman Proposals precipitated a·discussion of· the role of 
market forces and profits in a planned economy of the Soviet type. Some 
of the opinion generated openly rejected the proposals as dangerous to 
planning, per se, and implied that such proposals betrayed the achieve-
ments of the revolution. ·Otherwriters admitted the proposals had some 
merit, but could not agree with tbem-completely·and took issue with 
specific parts of the proposals. Still a third· group of ·writers 
endorsed the proposals and suggested:additional measures along the 
same lines as Liberman. A representative sample of these various 
opinions will be presented at this p·oint · to provide a· bails from which 
to evaluate the proposals. 
As one example of outright opp·osition we may look at the reaction 
of A. Zverev, former USSR Minister of Pinance, ·to the Liberman proposals 
with a statement of his opinion: 
The basis·of the concept which E. Liberman advances 
seems to me to be dubious, insufficiently thought out 
and inconsistent. Liberman takes an oversimplified 
and sketchy approach to the solution of an extremely 
complex problem.l 
Zverev also asserted in October, 1962, in Ekonomicbeskaya gazeta that 
1A. Zverev, "Against Oversimplification in Solving Compl• Problems," 
Problema of Economics, (Vol. V,012), p. 16. 
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"Planning is one of the principle" achievement~. of the October Revolu-
tion; why abandon it?"2 Zverev supports his· op.inion with an argument 
' . -
consisting of two main parts. Half of this argument ·revolves around 
theoretical considerations, and the other half divides .. the Liberinan 
proposals into four specific areas an:d·considers these.divisions 
individually. 
Zverev opens his attack on 'the Lil>eman·proposals·by stating that 
it is impossible to replace the role a~d power of state planning by 
establishing an average profitabiiity.rate for ~Ii enterprises, and 
that in fact, such an "innovation" would be detrimental to the 'economy. 3 
Adoption of the Liberman propos·als, according to Zverev, would preci-
pitate difficulties on the national ·1evel in drawing ·up the overall 
financial plan of economic .·developmEirit and in: the dis-tribution and 
redistribution of the national ·incom~ on branch ·and territorial basis; 
additionally, adoption of ' thesf! prc,'p~sals would weaken the rote of the 
State Planning c·ommittee;··tha ecoli~ic ·co(mc:f.ls :and financial. organs 
in planning costs and bringing the"qu~tas down to the ~nterprises. 4 
Finally, Zverev.notes that Liberman's usage of ·profitability and 
profits contradicts the ge~erally accepted theoretical concepts. 5 The 
"accepted theoretical concepts•·of'profitability and profits to which 
Zverev refers are those built ·around the Marxist concept that profit is 
the main part of the·surplus product created by the workers' surplus 
~ove, I!!!, Soviet Economy, p. 250. 
3 Zverev, p. 18. 
4Ibid. 
s Ibid., P• 18. 
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labor. In his proposals, Liberm~ implies that profit arises not only 
~ . ' . ... . ; - . 
from the labor embodied, but also from the fix~d and current assets. 
This is, of course, theoretically at odds.with the Marxist concept o~ 
the sterility of capital. Not only do the .Liberman proposals violate 
' 4 - -- • • 
the traditional concepts of Marxist value th~ory, but they also violate 
the methodological basis of price f~rmation in a planned sociali~t 
economy by relating price to production, wh~ch in Zverev's opinion is 
6 
characteristic of the capitalist sy~tem o~ economy. 
With this indictment on the theoretical leyel, Zverev proceeds to 
criticize the Liberman proposals on a p~int ~Y point ba~~~- Zve~ev 
summarizes the Liberman proposals into four main.statements for pur-
. . . 
poses of his appraisal: (1) T~e ~nly c~ntr~lized ta~gets handed down 
to the enterprise should be the volume ~d composition ~f production. 
. . .' ... , .• :· . .. 7 • • ·_ • ~ ' ' ' . : -
(2) Enterprises and workers sho~ld ~ec~ive p~emi~ for ~ulfillm~t.of 
• ' :- • '. • • • ' 11. ~ • -~ • • - .. 1, ... .... ... ~ ' •• 
the fixed profitability standard, with higher.premiums for o~erfulfill-
. . . ' 
ment of profitability indic~s! (3) The.enterprise should decide the 
remaining indices, including the amount and direct~on of investment. 
.. ,. : 
(4) Profits and profitability should no longer be drawn ~pin yearly 
• • • f 
plans, but instead, the planners sh~ul4. e~ta~lish average, _long-term 
7 profitability standards for.bomogen~ous,groupings of firms. 
< ' 'A 
Zverev begins his cri~iciem of_the Liberman.proposals by pointing 
to a contradiction which ~e feels lies in the. relationship between the 
State Planning Committee and the enterprise as defined by Liberman. 
Liberman points to the fact that the enterprise knows better than 
6tbid~ 
7 Ibid., p. 16. 
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anyone else its own productive capacities; he argues that the only 
centralized targets which should be handed down to the enterprise are' 
the volume and the composition,of production.- However, Zverev raises 
the question, "How can the State Planning Committee and the economic 
councils establish the volume and composition of production for enter-
s prises if they know the production capacities so poorly?" Zverev 
seems to be implying that according to 1 Liberman's rationale for re-
moving all of the indices from the·platming authorities except the 
"key" index of volume and assortment, it would be just· as logical to 
remove this last index as well. But, as Zverev points out,. the State 
Planning Committee and·the economic councils do know the.productive 
capacities of the firms or· otherwise· they 'would not- be able .. to plan 
9 and direct the productive activities of. the economy. However, in 
making the obvious s·tatement· that· the planning authorities do know the 
productive capacities of the fims, Zverev makes no reference to the 
imperfect quality of·thts·knowledge as a result of ·the tendency of 
plant managers to seek easy plans-by understating their potentials. 
In reference·- to the·' tendency o·f·managers to understate capacity, 
Zverev points out that even if the.Liberman proposals reduce this 
problem, a new bias in managerial behavior might arise as a result of 
the profitability index. Zverev· states-·that there is no guarantee under 
the Liberman system of profit·ability incentives, that managers will not 
understate their capacity and profitability rate with the intention of 
81b1d. 
9 Zverev, p. 16. 
52 
overfulfilling the plan and thus receiving·more·pre:mium funds.lO How-
ever, a careful consideration of the Liberman proposals indicates that 
the firm will receive more premium if .its actual production just matches 
or even fails to meet the planned target· tlian· if it:· overfulfills the 
planned target. 
The third point of the·proposals.-wit;h which Zverev takes issue is 
the fact that according to-Liberman, the enterprise should draw up the 
plan for the amount and direction of investment~ zverev raises the 
same issue here that most of the other critics·- use~ namely, that of 
achieving macro-balance~ He ·contends that the -individual enterprises 
are ignorant of the complex inter-relationships at the national level, 
and even if they'bad such~information, they would not be able to . 
achieve the necessary balance. 11 In othe·r words, if this part of the 
Liberman proposal ·were :l.inplemented, the· disc<repancies I.n· planning 
investments and the disproportions in industrial development would be 
even more serious than they are under the present syst·em. 
Liberman' s proposal that profits ·and profit.ability should no longer 
be drawn up in yearly plans; but· instead should be stated as average, 
long-term profitability standards ·fo-r homogeneous· groupings of firms ·1-s 
the final area of disagreement noted by ·zverev. He points to the fact 
that production cost is the.basic· qualitative ·index of any production 
12 . · .. . ',. plan. It is this index of -production coat which reflects reductions 
lOlbid. 
11 Zverev, p. 16. 
12 Ibid., P• 17. 
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in the expenditure of socia+ labor per ~nit of output, economies in the 
utilization of material inputs. anc1' binovations in ~he technical methods 
of production. Consequently;, the central auth~rities must have control 
of the cost quotas for enterpri~es.in order.to balance labor and material 
resources at the national level. 
Briefly, Zverev took issuawith the ~ibe~ propos~s in the~r 
entirety, but not all the reaction to th~ .pr~posals was this-extreme. 
The criticism of B. Sukharevskii, a memb,~r-ot the S~te C0111;1littee on 
Labor and Wages of the USSR C~uncil of ~sters, is an exampl~ of that 
part of the Russian reaction whic~ found_ both good and bad points in the 
Liberman proposals. Despite the, f~ct tha_t he did not_ agree with the 
proposals completely, B. Sukharevskii found.s~~ei-al points with which 
he could .agr~e. In. fact,, S~r~vskii · impli~s that_ .c~rtain ;aspects . of 
. - . . . 
the LiberJDan proposal~~bav~ a aJUb~_t8!1ti~J .. pot~tia_l. f~r: future improve-
ment of the Soviet method of P.l,an~g. 
The Liberman.proposals are- di~cussed by B. Sukharevskii from two 
points of view; one is the general or macr~-approach and tke other is 
a more specific, micro-investiga~i~D· In his general approach ~o the 
proposals, Sukbarevskii refers to Libe~n's key index of profitability 
based on assets as an "automatic self-regulator" and.admists that Comrade 
13 Liberman is moving 1n the right d:trectiou.. 1:fowever. Sukbarevskii takes 
issue with Liberman'& proposals ,on grounds which resemble a fallacy of 
composition type argument.. B~ states that: 
The root of the mistake of this proposal lies in the 
fact that it ignores the unity of physical and value 
13B. Sukharevakii, "On Improving the l'orms and Methods of Material 
Incentives," Problems tl Economics, (Vol. V, 1112), p. 4. 
relations in social reproduction and·confuses the 
conditions of reproduction of a single enterprise with 
those for the national ,economy as ·a whole.14 -
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Sukharevskii seems primarily concerned-with.balance at the macro-
level in maintaining that the individual enterprise is closely related 
to the national economy via commodity-money·relationships which occur 
in both physical and value terms. -He maintains that proper proportions 
must be ensured both in physical and·value terms in order for an econ-
omy to develop on a ·planned basis. Sukharevskii admits ·that the 
Liberman proposals satisfy the requirements of physical palance between 
money income and available commodities must·be maintained and that 
profitability is not automatically self-regulating in this category of 
balance. Not every increase of profitability will ensure the creation 
of the necessary·material·found.ation for-higher wages; hence the need 
for planning wage~funds for the·enterp~ise from above. 15 
Sukharevskii differentiates between the singie firm and the economy 
as a whole with reference to'the applicability of the Liberman proposals. 
At the firm level, it is possible that the· ·funds resulting from an in-
crease in profitability may be used for invt!stment:or raising the wages 
of the workers. But, according-to Sukharevskii, such assumptions hold 
good only as long as they refer ·to a single enterprise;· as soon as these 
assumptions &~etexpandednai ehertnajieaal econC>tlly as a whole, there is no 
guarantee that every enterprise will secure the required means of produc-
tion and consumer goods unless hnese t~quirements are planned and 
14 Sukharevskii, p. 4. 
15Ibid. 
balanced at the national levei.16 Sukhareyskii also.que.stions the 
compatibility of individual investment decisions at .the firm level 
. ' . ... . . .. •' . . ., . ·-·· . 
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based on profitability and the long-ttirm satisfaction of national 
economic requirements. Since investment pians :·affec~ the balance of pr 
productive capacities of the economy at thei~ inception and for several 
years in the future, these investm$Dt decis~ons mus~-be bal.anced at 
the national level to achieve the long-run preferences of the cen~ral 
planners for national development. .T~~s, ~.Su~.r~vskii argues, .central-
. ·~ . ·_ ·_,. ~ 
ized planning for enterprises -~~ot be ,-liJnj.~ed 'to. ·the so-called 
. . . ' 
quantity-assortment targets; what may be possible for the individual 
. .. 
finn is not necessarily guaranteed automatically for the economy as a 
.·~:,~..-· • :·_1,· .. ~r ~. • 
whole within .the constraints of the need for macro-balance in the 
.. 
investment-commodity markets and the desire of central authorities to 
... ' '·"' . pursue specific long-run investment plans. 
. . .... 
After his discussion of the Liberman proposals with reference to 
' . 
the general view, Sukharevskii co~siders the proposals in a specific 
context with the major emphasis on incentive indices and the standards 
by which these indices are evaluated. Sukbarevskii feels that the 
. . . 
Liberman type profitability index based on assets has advantages over 
the other indices of output, labor productivity, and production costs. 
, I 
He lists three main advantages of the profitability ind~ over alter-
native indices; First, profitability reflects changes in both quantity 
and quality indices of plant operation; second, profits reflect a social 
evaluation of the expenditure of labor which society considers necessary 
16 Sukharevskii, p. 5. 
because these profits depend on pri·ces; and third, ·profitabilit1 . 
reflects the extent of utilization of productive assets .to·include 
both living labor and material labir.17 
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But Sukbarevskii also points to.-the fact that an index based on 
profitability alone does not provide ·a dynamic :measure of the forward 
movement of the operations of the enterprise.18. ·sukharevskii states 
that: 
Since the formation of-the bonus fund depends only on 
the profitability achieved, the enterprise will be 
able to receive-' ·substantial ·bonuses without -improvi'Dg 
its work as compared with_the already achieved leve1.19 
. . . . . 
He, therefore, recommends that whether the index used is output, labor 
• , ,· :."'..:~ ~ • • ~ f~I_.\ .. : . I. iJ.'· • • t: ~~-~· ~·· :· 
productivity, production.coats, prof~t_o~ somet~ing else, the index 
- . ' ' . . ' .. . ~ ~ 
should be based on the improvement of plant operation with the bonus 
, ,
1 
t I • ,. :' : .: 't •, - ! 1 f 1, • .- 0 , •' l ; , < : , • • • 
rate differentiated to take into account the achieved level. Sukharev-
skii argues that with his b9nus s~heme, regardless of the level already 
- ... • ' #. 
achieved, the firm will be stimulated to improve its work from one 
• • '' ,• I . • • " ' • ' ~ _, • • ~ I 
20 period of operation to the next. ' 
• ~·I. r"' I 'k
0
, • 
Two other disadv~tag~_of th~ profitability ind~- to which 
Sukharevskii c~~ls attention_ are t~e p~oblems associated with the 
I •' .. , 
indivisibility of the incentive fund when this fund is determined by 
. ,, . ' . . 
the single index of profitabi~ity, ~d the b~t~rogeneity of industry, 
per se. Sukharevskii contends that the incentive fund should facilitate 
the stimulation of both individual and collective incentives, but that 
17
sukbarevskii, p. 9. 
18Ibid., p. 6. 
19Ibid. 
ZOibid. , p. 6. 
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when the whole incentive fund is based on _p~ofitab~ty ~one, it is 
difficult to divide the bonuses into shop and section ~evels. 21 ~ 
Briefly, he believes that the profita~ility -~~ex ~orks_ well.enough 
in providing collective. incentives tq the fi,;m }1& a unit, but that t~e 
total operation of the firm is th~ result of _different catego~ies of 
workers whose contribution to that total operation -~ no.t always . the 
same. Thus, to maintain individual inc~ntives.a~ well as the collec-
tive incentive, the ma~~r~al inc~t.i~e .fu~~ _should not be -unifo?: 
enterprises should have speciai~ed fun.d~ f.or s~ecific categories of 
their operation, e.g. a bonus fund.fo~_ engin•ering-tecbnical personnel 
22 
and office employees, a bonus fund for, ne.w,mach~e~, etc. 
Sukharevskii gives Lib.erman:~redit fQ:,: takiug a step in the right 
direction in formul~~ing t~e .p~ofit•b~µ,_ty .. indices. dif.f~rently for 
different groups of Jimilar f;L~s ~ithi,;i. :81!- ~ndustry~ .. b~t he adds that 
in the future ano~her step _fol"!a~d ~'!ioul~ be made:. the prices according 
to which the enterp~iaes market their output should be .differentiated 
23 for groups of enterprises. But, Su~arevakii's suggestion relative 
to prices takes his discussion in~o_t~, realm of standards by which to 
evaluate Liberman's pr~fitability ~ndex •. 
He agrees with Liberman that._ standards o~ evaluation should J?e 
established for at least. two (?r.three yfars and that firms with 
similar operating conditions.should be grouped_together under the same 
21Ibid., P• 10. 
22 . 
Sukharevskii, p. 11. 
23Ibid., p. 8. 
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profitability index, but he addi:/~o··Libenitan.'s · ~ugg~sti~ns ~ considera-
tion of prices in evaluating 'profitability~ 'At tlie· present, S~rtet 
prices are based on·average costs':ln iiu·:1.nci~tx,f piu~·:a giveti'profit 
' ... , • . ., • • f r , '. , , , , 
margin and are not adapted to separate· groups·'of ·related enterprises. 
This present profit calcuiatio~· incltided in. pricing ·[procedures i~ -
' • . ' .. '-l ' • . . • 
based on the ratio of profits to producti6n ~osts'arid not the asset 
base of the firm. Consequently, if material incentives are to be 
established on the oasis of a c~rtairi.relati~nsldp ~f profits to assets, 
this sould be taken~into account in the.price struct~re ~s we11. 24 
Additionally, the.present price system ·attenipts to reconcile the condi-
tions of production' and to·stimulate i cert~in structure of consumption. 
In that profitability~ ealctil~t:l~ns· ii.fe.·b~sed'cin-.prices/'t:he~e caicula-
tions reflect both the conditions of;pf6d~~tio~ ~d at"the same time, 
the desired structure of consumption. But, if the profitability index 
is to become the basis of material inc~ntives '·r~lative. to production, 
the profitability calculation m~t:be"littlc~d with the.requirements of 
producing the goods'in questionf~and not the prices set by the planners 
in an effort to ciear the ~arket of these particular gooes. 25 
With these stiggestions for ··changes :i.n the price ·system, Stikharevskii 
proposes an improvem~t of the. materi~l incentive system in two stages: 
In the first stage·, measur~s -sho~ld ·be taken that can be carried out 
before a general adjusl:*e~~: df 'pficeii .. _is ·und~ttli.ken, and ·1.n the second 
. ~ . . 26 
stage, measures should be taken ·together ·with the price adjustment. 
24 Sukhareva~i, p, 9. 
25tbid •. 
26tbid. 
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In essence Sukhareyskii is augges-~.ins,. ~t.~;:ln th~- cc;,nst.r4'nts of th~ 
existing price system, ~ impl~~tation ofi .th43 Libe~ pro.posals for 
a profitability index to improve tbe .. materifl]. · inc~ti-y-~ •yst~.. But at 
some future time, he. suggests chang~ in tJte. price. s.tJ"U~ture which will 
take Liberman's profitability index into cons~d~ra~iQn· an~, in fact, 
reinforce the effectiveness-of the.indu._µi_providing incentiye to the 
individual firm. 
In his discussion of ~he Liberm~~.proposals, Sukharevski uses-the 
points with which he_.agrees as a b~is for,_.':lalg.ng_. fur~her sµggestions of 
reform, especially ,Q.th ~eferen~~_to tq~ Soviet:pric~ system. :Ano~per 
writer whose reaction to the prQpoJ~ls-ia simil@.r-~o.~ha~ of-Sukharevskii 
is I. Kasitskii. Be, too,. agre~s with L~~e~~ ·~- proposais· in part, but 
he also suggests changes whic~ w~uld,-1~ his opi~ion, ~p~ove the. 
proposals~ \'i"' ··: 
I •. Kasitskii. is.~assqcifilted.:w:itll-: the CQ•it:tee on Economics and 
. 27 Production of the USSR Council of Scientific and Technical Societjes. 
" . . . ... .... ,, .. 
He agrees with the LiberDl811 pr,oposals on basically three poiQts. In 
reference to indices in.general, _Kasitsldi admits that there sbould be 
long-term stability of indices and that thes~'indi~es must be carefully 
28 differentiated for 4"i~feren~ groupµigs .. of simil•~ -~terprises. Be also 
concedes that the plan should not be the decisive-index, but~ order to 
avoid casting pla~ing 'c aside, _ICasitskii stipulates that :the plan must be 
a prerequisite for premium awards or bonusea. 29 In other.words; there 
27I. Kasitsldi, "The Main Question: Criteria for Premiums and Indices 
Planned for Enterprises," Problems of Economics, (Vol. V, 1112), P• 12. 
28Ibid. , p. 14 ., 
29Ibid., p. 13. 
60 
should be a planned target which must be fulfilled in order to receive 
an incentive reward, but this bonus should be calcula1:ed-.on some index 
other than output or plan fulfillment. In this re$pect Kasitskii's 
agreement with the Liberman proposals is quite similar to that of 
Sukharevskii, but in his appraisal of Liberman's profitability indes, 
Kasitskii introduces different considerations. 
Kasitekii opens his discussion of profitability ,nth· the statement 
that profitability has always been defined·in economic practice.~d 
literature as the percentage relationship of-profi~a from s~les to 
30 production coat of the goods sold. .lie then goes, on -to contrast this 
usual definition with Liberman'• concept of profits expressed as a 
percentage of assets.- Kasitskii doe&-llOt hesitate to point-out that 
Liberman'& .profitability ind~:_,is ~otlt~g mo~e ;h~_-a,capitalistic 
concept. of the rate :Of p,:pf;Lt oo. inves,ted ~llpi-tal:•t He, then lists the 
possible disadvantages which might.arise •t the firm level by using 
Liberman's concept~ of profitability. 
By using· the index of- pro.fitability •s a percentage of •asets, 
Kasitskii maintains that ,this wo~ld. induce .. t}la fi:tm to be primarily 
interested in reducing the denomi~ator of su~h-a ~elationship, i.e._ 
assets. This inclination on th• part. of _.firm directors to reduce assets 
would have a positive effect on the- operatiop of, the firm relati'.Ve to 
current assets, but not .so with-- fixed_ assets. - In reference .to -fixed 
assets, Kasitekii feels_ th·at ,profitability. bJfiJed on assets would. result 
in technological stagnation·, .no improvemep.ts in utilization of machinery 
JOibid., p. 14. 
and finally a reduction of investment: in -fixed· assets. 31 It is the 
last of these with which Kaaitskii takes··pai't:tcular :issue~ He con-
tends thatany tendency on the part of an· irid!~idual :enterprise:· to 
reduce investment in fixed assets may conflict with the national -~ 
planning preference of the central authoritfes.· ·_,. 
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This concern with the relationship of the 'centrai planners tcf the 
individual enterprises also leads Kasitskii 'to contes·t Liberman' s 
proposal that profitability serve ··as the key index. · Kasitskii points 
out the importance of j central: ·control over labor<resources and wage . 
funds in order tomaintain national balance in ··labor markets, to: affect 
currency circulation, :to ·strengthen the ruble and to regulate retail 
trade. 32 Consequently, Kasit·sldi- concludes that even .though· profit.a-
bility expressed as a per·centage :of· asset's· ":i.s '.·an ilb.porfant ind'ex·, it· 
should not be the only index, but· .. rather;~- ··since both profits· and ·prices 
in the Sovie-t -economy ltave be.en i"ela·ted: tb costs -of: production in prac-
tice, the cost of production index should·be'consfdered the.key index 
with the other indices merely supplementing' ·:t:ts 1effectiveness. 
Three other.writers wnose views are similar to those ·of Sukharevskii 
and Kasitskii are summarized -b~ie·fly :and ~ol1ect:i.vely~ .. In presenting 
their criticism, emph'as':ts is placed on those viewpoints original to 
their discussion of Liberman's proposals, and areas in which there is 
general agreement ~i~h the other write,;a are mentioned .!!. passant. 
In their respective discussions ·of the Liberman proposals., G. 
Kosiachenko, K. Plotnikov, and L._ Al' tei; expi,-ess the common opinion 
31 Ibid., P• 14. 
32Ibid. 
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that Liberman in seeking a solution to the problems of planning.makes 
the mistake of isolating the individual enterprise from the national 
33 
economy as a whole. They feel this leads Liberman to rely o~ the 
profitability index as an automatic "self-regulator'' whic;h · along with 
volume and composition of output is the only target. the .central author-
ities should hand down to the firm. In addition to their collective 
objection that this proposal, if implemented, would weaken unified 
national economic planning, they also indicate the necessity of central 
control over both investment and wage fundsplanning or serious national 
imbalance in industrial development and both the commodity and producer 
goods markets will result. 
They agree with the Liberman proposal-in reference to the-calcula-
tion of indices for groups of similar industries, but take issue with 
Liberman' s. use of only one key: index~profitability. : Plotnikov states 
that the indices should be differ~ntiated accorduig to branches of 
industry and·typest.of:production, and·tbat an·enterprise's work should 
be assessed with the help of·a··set of indices; ·both in value and- physical 
terms. 34 Kosiachenko refers to.the_ sametbing·:ln stipulating that in 
addition to.certain common indices· for all branches-, tt it1-necessary to 
establish specific indices for.eacb 1 branch of·tbe econom.y. 35 Al'~er 
330. Kosiachenko, "Important Condition for Improvement of Planning," 
Problems of Bconomics, :(Vol. V. 1112), · P• 21., . - · 
K. Pl 
K. Plotnikov, "E. G~ · Libetman: · Right and Wrong," Problems .21 
Economi,£~_- (Vol. V. 1112), p. 24. 
L. Al'ter, "Incentives Must Be Linked with the Long-Term Planning 
of an Enterprise1" Problems~ Economics, (Vol. V. 1/12), P• 26. 
34 Plotnikov, p. 2S. 
35 Koaiachenko, p. 22. 
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arrives at a similar conclusion in his statement that the role of profits 
must be raised, long-term standards should ·be· :t.ntroduced into· the mater-
ial incentive system, and.high plan: assiguments must be stimulated, but 
these three elements should not be:viewed as-an-automatically function-
ing mechanism which will eliminate· the need for,. planning. other impo~tant 
indices such as labor . productivity·, production costs, . wage funds; capital 
investment, supplies and innovation.~6 . ·. 
All of the discussions presented(. thus ·far. bave··contained various : . 
degrees of agreement and disagreement with the liberman proposals; but 
v. Nemchnov, Director of-the Laboratory of Bconomic-and·Mathemati.cal 
Methods of the .USSR Academy. of Sciences, attempts_ to reconcile: thes·e 
various schools of thought by emphasizing the_:_positive··approach; he 
states: "We should establish what,unites us with E~~Liberm.an and not 
what disunites us. "~7_ . The first) point ·,upon which .·there· should be 
general agxeement is the necessity for ·.a· system which would stimu1ate 
the enterprise to demand ~-uhe most intensive plan and .report its capacity 
honestly. Nemchinov also .insists that fhed:asset&"&hould not be cost-
free.38 There should be a charge associatad with·the·expansion of 
production in order to take into-account the.resources used in this 
expansion. Additionally, ·profitability planniug should.not be based on 
production costs alone, but should.also take·into.consideration the ex-
tent to which the production:-process .ts provided with fixed-assets. The 
final cOUDD.on ground of opinion according to·Nemchinov, is that the 
37v. Nemchinov, "Making Enterprises Interested in More Intensive 
Plans," Problems .21 Economics, (Vol. V, #12). 
38Ibid. 
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enterprise requires a ·single source for its .incentive. fund, but not 
necessarily established by a universal index. 39 . These are the ·common: 
points of agreement from which the Liberman proposals must be consi-
dered and from which the possibilities of ·comp~omise must be explored •. ,. 
Nemchinov attempts to reconcile these ·:various· ·.criticisms not by 
defending the minor points and details over which controversy arose, 
but rather by suggesting changes.in.two basic areas-of.Soviet-economics 
material allocation and the price Jystem.- _ These changes, if implemented, 
would provide a framework -within which '.the· Liberman proposals-would 
assume greater validity than~they would under the existing system. 
In the Kommunist, in 1964, Nemchinov suggested a scheme which would 
place more, emphasis on enterprise .tin!ltiative; and .·at· the:same time re-
duce the materials allocation system to price control·over the minimum 
40 
amount of·basic materials, fuels, and a few essential·consumers' goods. 
Nemchinov suggested that the planning authorities.place orders _among 
various enterprises according to plan.requirements, but these state 
orders would be in terms of final·· goods and not intermediate goods-. The 
enterprise would submit, in advance ·.its proposals ·as- to how it would 
carry out a certain planned order nth respect to.assortment, quality, 
delivery date, and price~ 41- · This would be very much like a bid for 
government contract as we.-know it in.the.United States. 
After having received· these ''bids;" the. planning organs·. would place 
their orders with those firms whose bids were the best for the national 
39tbid. 
40 Nove, The Soviet Economy, p. 253. 
41tbid. 
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plan. The resulting competition among' firms· 'for '.the state o·rders would 
allow the state to satisfy its needs at the· ·1owea:ft ·~oat·, and the inter-
mediate goods would be sub-contracted ·amdng firms· ·on· a mutual trade 
basis. 42 With this scheme, firms would be motivated by determine their 
( •' ' . ~ ... 
own investment programs based on the requirements ··of 'their custoniers, ·-
whether state or individual. 
In reference to the price system, Nemchinov had to propose a change 
which would stress the relationship of value and the satisfaction of 
wants without openly violating the traditional labor theory of value. 
Nemchinov asserted that the socially necessary expenditure of labor must 
. . 
be determine:lby reference not only to the expenditure of labor but also 
, ·.! - . r ~ 
to its ~uID:tfS..43 Nemchinov advocated that this lfetemmllpaiion be achieved 
by the use of a "transformed form .of value" corresponding to real costs 
· 
1 • . ' ~ . t ~.. ·~ ~ ~ • 1 ·,J: ., ~ • ..= • [ · - : : ·' :· ' r "• • '" ,f r • ' • 
from the standpoint _of the ~ation~l ec~nOllly arrived at by adding to the 
prime c?st (c _+ v). flll _ ~~'ft?-t :~ompo2'e~" ~~. /a stan~~rd ~~pi~al ~h~rge plus 
44 
a differential re~t. Nemchinov expected _this differentia~ ~ent ~actor 
to be calculated on computers taking into consideration the relative 
availability and relative advantages of land, minerals and factories by 
45 
reference to the intended results· and the basic lines of the plal).:. 
Nove suggests that:Nemchino'V's proposal for determining in advance .a 
variable differential rent,· a·variable·profit.norm, for different. 
industries and for different enterprises in the same industry permits an 
46 Nove, p. 297. 
47Ibid. 
48 
· Nemchinov. p. 19. 
49 Nove, p. 249. 
501bid. 
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approach to a marginal basis for price. 46 ·· .. Nemchinov J neV'er-· openly re-
1a tes price to scarcity, but insists ,instead that the surplus product 
be div1ded proportionately among, tb, c~~dit,4?DB:·~, pr~~uction .i,n rela-
ti.on to means and needs. 47 r··_ .. ·.· i_ : ·• 
After having made these suggestions, Nem.chinov reassures the propo-
nents of planning that he is not trying to abandon the fruits of the 
revolution with his statement that the shortcoming in planning is not a 
defect of the system, but rather of the planning practices connected 
with planning intermediate, rather than final results. 48 
Nemchinov was not the only advocate of a capital chargealong the 
lines of Liberman's suggestion. V. Trapeznikov in an article in Pravda, 
August 17, 1964, included a charge on capital in his "libermanist" 
proposals. 49 Liberman'& proposals were also endorsed by L. Vagg and 
50 s. Zakharov in their suggestions for a revaluation of capital assets. 
They advocated an annual capital charge of 20 percent of the value of 
the total capital in an effort to increase the relative costs of the 
better equipped enterprises. They also admitted that a more rational 
price system was necessary if capital calculations of this nature were 
to be effective. 
In this resume of Russian reactiontX> the Liberman proposals, advan-
tages, disadvantages, and suggestions for further improvement of the 
proposals have been presented. But now the direction of this thesis is 
46 Nove, p. 297 • 
.:,7Ibid. 
48 Nemchinov, p. 19. 
49 Nove, p. 249. 
SOibid. 
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pointed to a general evaluation of these proposals and their impact 
on Soviet economic thought. This evaluation will consider theadvan-
tages associated with the proposals, the questions raised by the 
proposals, and the implications ·involved in resolving these questions • 
. • -· • > 
: . L : c • j • 
: ~ .., . 
CHAPTER V !" .. 
EVALUATION, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
The viewpoints presented in the precedil:lg .chapter summarize the 
various advantages and disadvantages of. the·Liberman .. prop·osals as the 
Russians see them. At this · point, an, evaluation- of· the prop·osals is 
presented with reference to economic rationality. Balance,::··.coordination, 
and efficiency are the focal points of this ,evaluat:ion. The primary 
question raised by an evaluation __ of the proposals revolves aroU11d the 
need for balance and coordination between the actions of the central 
planners and the individual enterprises. This need for balance and 
coordination at both the macro- and·micro-levels:is ·part of ·Campbell's 
definition of economic rationality.as ·stated in-Chapter·II: of-this paper.1 
In the discussion of the Liberman.proposals; ·the problem ·of merging 
planning with the activities of .semi-autonomous· enterprises lies at the 
heart of the controversy. Whether the critics .refer to this problem as 
a threat to planning or ·to economic. and :financial balance,· the ~fact re--
mains that if the enterprise is given· control _of all·indices except the 
key index of profitability standards ·and a given ·quantity and 'assortment 
of output, there 1:s the possibility tha~ :lmbalance. will occur at the macro-
level of the economy. Specifically, imbalance may occur in the investment' 
and consumption sectors of the economy. 
1 Campbell, p. 29. · 
68 
69 
It is conceivable that taken individually; each-firm. could deter-
mine :its own investment program, but when considered collectively within 
the constraint of the existing materials allocation system in Soviet 
planning, there is the possibility that the total of ~utonomously 
directed investment may not balance at the macro-level. If each firm 
is allowed to formulate its own investment requirements, this may create 
imbalance in two ways: (1) The investment plan· of the firm may not . 
coincide with the planned development of the national economy as deter-
mined by the planners. (2) In·view of the scarcity of; investment· goods 
under the plan, each firm may not be able to obtain the necessary re-
sources to achieve its own investment plan. Briefly, a course. -of action 
which might be quite poseibl:e for: a 'single .. firm ~is not necessarily 
possible when expanded, in the context of a central plan, to all firms 
in the economy. · · l . ' '. . ~ ._ t . 
.: • I 
Given the structure of the Soviet price system, imbalance also might 
occur in the consumer goods section·if. firms exercise autonomy in deteT-
mining their respective wage and labor requirements. This -practice would 
remove from the central· planners their control,over the income released 
into the hands of consumers. · In the absence o£ such central coutrol over 
the source of disposable ·income, imbalance'in this sector could result in 
inflationary pressures ·on prices. 1:f .such··a phenomenon -can be conceived 
in a Soviet type system, or·at the very least, imbalance at the micro-
level in the form of shortages and surpluses of specific goods in the 
tota1 market. · 
Additionally, imbalance might occur in·the labor market relative to 
the total supply and demand for labor •t establish~d wage scales and the 
allocation of the labor force. Oiven·the fixed supply of labor, if finis 
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could draw up the:1.r own demands for labor, :Lt· is"'po~·sible· that ·demand 
could exceed supply in the nationai' labor market in ~p~cific areas of 
industries and in certain categories of· labor. · Witli-' wage rs.tee·' fixed 
by planners, excessive demands of certain types of highly desired labor 
would result in a shorta8e of this type of labor with no means auch'as 
flexible wages or central allocation to''·r~soive. the. shortage. 
Balance among these various sectors ·is·traditionally attempted· in 
the Soviet economy by central planning of the.pertinent indices. How-
ever, in Liberman's proposal, these.indices will be.left to th~ discre-
tion of the firm and no mention is made in· the Libenttan proposals-of the 
impact of profitability criterion ·'on' e:i.ther \nater:Lalii-ai.iocation,. the: 
price system, or the maintenattce of finailcial balance.·. ·The fact'-that 
the Liberman proposals avoid the·prdblem·of int:egrating·tbe autonbmy·of 
enterprise activity &id 'the\ise= of':fh~ pr6fitability ---~ifiterion ritb :,the 
activities of· planners on the'nati~rial~ievei iliiits to~a considerable 
degree the partial requirement of bal.ance'·a:uid co~rdi~ation as a part of 
achieving rationality. 
• • ·, . . •. ' ' 1 . . . 
Unless an integration'of the·activity of the 
firm wi.th the planned totality of economic actirlty-can be pr~vided, the 
implementation of Liberman's suggestions·may cause serious imbalance at 
the macro-level. ·Liberman, himself,· indicated that his· primary·· concern 
was the individual enterprise, and 'his proposali apply rathet well.in 
reducing the problems encountered by the firm~·. This is a step::in the 
right direction, but the proposais do not 8Xp1ain how,·at the national 
level' the decisions of the planners will tui'l\ · 'out to coincide with the 
independently-made decisions of semi-autonomous enterprises. 
This evaluation with ref erenc·e to balance and coordination does not 
complete the investigation of Liberman's .proposals relative to rationalitY 0 
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Rationality requires efficiency as ~11 as b4llance 81\d: ~oor:dina:tion. 
Liberman's emphasis on profitability'.as -t~e key index t~_his propo•als 
necessitates the consideration of the meaning Lo£ px:ofj~ ~. a Soviet-
type system. 
Profit acts in a free market as an µidi_cato~. of- .efficiency. The 
existence of profit serves to guide resourJes ~o.their 1'lOSt efflcient 
use. Resources are considered to be used- most: efficient-iy when ~hey· 
yield a maximum return relative to economic coat in r,J..ation. to tlie 
sacrifice of the next best alternative use to whi~h- the resource- ~ould 
be put. Therefore, given the coat. of resources and the product prices, 
the most efficient use of resources will ~~eate -the_g~eate~~ value prod-
2 
uct at the least cost and~oµ~equen~iy, ,;e,~lt-i11-·il)ta mc,st·p~ofit. 
The existence of profit also provides prc:>ducers-witlt the ince11tive 
3 to produce -goods which are in .greatest ~en:aand--~Y ~ons~ers.- . Iq -the 
short-run, given a system of scarci~y,- prices and a fixed -supply of a 
particular good, consumers will _express. their vt?-luation of.,_each good by 
the price they are willing to pay .. for it.. Obviously, UIJ.d~r.-thee~ condi-
tions, those goods upon which consum~i:s ,plac;e~li• gr•ate1;1t valuation 
will coDDDand the highest prices, and produc~r~-of these goQds will 
receive the greatest relative incomes. Assuming thi, income received 
by producers relative to their ~osts is large.enough ~o.create a pure 
economic profit in the short~run, -_the :~:Lst~~e ,ot the pu~e p~oftt serves 
as a signal to producers that more of. the .good· is t,antecJ by socj.ety • · In 
the long-run, produc~rs will tend to.~and pE94uctiqn. of the goods which 
2In speaking of the existence of profit, the writer is assuming a price 
and cost structure of such a nature that·proftt is ~Teated. 
3The term "goods" in this discussion reiers to either intewie-diate 
or final goods. 
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yield a profit, and th~~, ol;,yiously.ep.ough, ~~:increas,e tb~,:supply 
of the goods upon which consume~s. pla_ce. t;h~ gr~atest-v11~uatioJ1. . ~~se-
quently, this efficient allocation of r~source~ .will c,;eate the 
greatest consumer satisfaction •. , __ ', : ",. , .. .,,. 
This discussion indicates the economic signi-fican~e of profit and 
the relationship of profit to ~atio~ality.via:th~ effect of profit in 
guiding resources into their most _efficient .:us~s .•. _, B~t, is this signifi-
cance the same under a market. pr,iCi~-:d~rect~d sy~t~m .~d a _system Qf. · 
planned prices? This is the crucial question which must be considered 
in an evaluation of the Libe~an proposals •.. 
The economic sign~_ficance_- of profit1 ~n;.a So,Y(i,e:~ j:ype ·eCQnomy differs 
from that which prevails under a ma~~et p~ice ~ystem.- As indinated in 
Chapter I, Soviet1 prices_ are_ fix~~~~, the; c_entr,µ. :Pl~~ers f,or• r.elatively 
long periods of time and are ~et to .reflec~_both costs of production and 
a predetermined structure.of consu~ption. Prices serve as j.nd1.ces of 
control set by the planners to direct,the7 activity of tll~ economy toward 
predetermined goals. Thus, planned pric~s ~~tlect th~· pfeferences and 
controls of the plan,;iing authority; wh.,reas, market prices reflect the 
preferences of consumers and .th~ sca~city 9f e~onomic resources. Now 
the questions aris~s, how do~s .this difference affect pfoftt? 
Profit will no~_ di.r~ct resource~ ~C? .. th~ir most efficient use if the 
prices and costs upon which profitability cal~~tatio~s.are •de refle~t 
the preferences of the planners rather .than utility-cost ieiationships 
as expressed in the market. . Profit under planned pric•. w~ll direct 
resources to uses preferred by the planners, whether these uses are the 
most efficient or not. This allocation of resources in the direction of 
the preferences of the central planners is reinforced by the Soviet 
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system of materials-allocation. In cases: involv~g the,-$l,1Qcation of a 
resource considered oritica11;y the planners, profit will.· have no effect 
on the allocation; the allocation will be made ·by. the pJ.~ers ~9 -facil-
itate the fulfillment of a predetermined objectiv~. _Even if pl4uners 
attempted to set prices to duplicate the operation pf -.a market ~ystem, 
their task would be veritably impossible as a·resQ.l.t_Qf the -imperfect-
ness of their knowledge, the complexity and. int~rdepen4,.ance of_ ec_onomic 
activity, and the physical administration· of p,:-ice• r•quir4g · frequent. 
changes. 
So we can see that under a system of p.lanned· prices,- .profit is not : 
a very reliable indicator of efficient use o.f · r~purc•t:1 • ~ ~µt · ef.ficient 
allocation ·of resources is· not! 1the- only. :funct~OJl~ o.f: pi;ofii. ~d~r a 
market-directed price system. Profit alao p~ovides· ~he i~centive .for 
producers to produce gootis, ei'ther 1neermediate or final, upon which 
customers place.the greatest valuation. In p~oviding -pro4ucers ~th 
an incentive to produce goods upon which the _coqumer pl~ces tpe 
highest valuation, prof it under planned prices. again f.all-s short of 
profit under a market-directed price system. 
Profit calculations based on planned pri.cet\l reflec_t the. pref~rences 
of the planners and not the consumer. If· a particular -fim or ~dustry 
shows a high profitability, more resources will no,,au~omatically-move 
into that particular ·type of production. Reso~rces will mov~ into this 
area only if they are so directed as part of _a centrally de$igned 
investment plan. In short, free entry and exit as ~soc;,iated with .a 
market system does not exist for socialized units of produ~tion in a 
Soviet type economy. 
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Profit under planned prices does not ·-necessarily, reflect a .high 
consumer valuation on that product relative to alternatives ·:that must 
be given up. The high price causing·the profit may merely,be set at 
this high level to ration a particular commodity -which is in· short 
supply because the planners do not want its-pr~duction ·increased. 
In view of this restricted role of profits under a planned price· 
system, the question comes to mind, why did Liberman choose profita-
bility as his key index? Liberman was pr:lmarily'interested in improving 
incentives and planning at the firm level; -so he tied the incentive fund 
to the profitability index which would be computed for groups of similar 
firms and based on both current and fixed assets. Even though centrally 
administered prices and materials-allocation prevent profitabilityffrom 
assundng the role it does in a market economy,.it still could provide 
an incentive at the individual f·irm· level. ··: : i=-; • ·~ ... 
The autonomy Liberman suggests for the firm in drawing up its own· 
plan except for the profitability· index and amount and ··composition of 
output and the freedom in the use of the incentive fund does increase 
• i 
'· ~ . 
the motivation of the individual firm director to strive for greater 
efficiency in his own production and· decreases his desire ·to,.under-
state his output p~tential.- Additionally, Liberman's profitability 
t' 
index is a first step toward introducing a charge for invested :capitals 
into the cost calculations of the firm and suggests a basis · for a more 
efficient allocation of capital resources·rather than the present more 
or less arbitrary method of central allocation of inve·stment. Th~se, 
then. are the effects on efficiency contained in the Liberman proposals. 
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Liberman proposals is revealed 
by the fact that their publication brought forth open discussion of the 
1S 
Soviet planning system and its improvement.· ·Whether the ensuing · 
discussion was against the proposals, for tneni, or for the!rtmoclifiea-
tion, economic controversy was stimulated. Even the conservative 
planners had to think in order to defend their·system"·from·'this liberal 
suggestion for reform. But most important ·of all,- the,·proposals ·directed 
attention to the concepts of capital· investment and profits and to·. the 
Soviet systems of pricing and allocating materials, ·and .. this, if nothing 
else, is a step in the right direction •. · tu shor:t .. , tiberm.an 's·-proposals 
greatly stimulated Soviet economic thoughf.· • 
According to Campbell~ th~ suggestioti-.of E·~ ·G. Liberman-that an 
enterprise should be freed from '"petty tutelage" by "bigher :1evel. bureau-
crats and judged only by its. pro'fit. r~su:1:ts' eli.cit:ed- ·so favo·rable a 
response from managers that "Lib'e-rmaniam" · has: become 'an·· articulate and 
influential movement. 4 In his 'article· 'on· the· l1ibeiman· 1>rc;·pos1als, · A~-
Zverev, one of the chief opponents of the sugg°'ested- refonis states that: 
The questions posed -by'Libeiman have at-tracted wide-
spread attention and ap~rked a lively discussion_ of 
many vial problems,; Undoubeedly this will -consid-
erably accelerate the sear.ch for, and elaboration of, 
the best methods of material.' fucentives.S · : ,.·· 1• - · 
Most of the authors ·coli.tributing ·to; the .Liberman dis~cu·ssion··made similar 
statements regarding' the necessity ior 'turtbet- study in ·improving plan-
ning and the material . incentive. sys'teii.· . Kas:i.tskif ~uggests a. series of 
two stages in achieving the solution of the problems surrounding planning 
and i.ncentives: First, the criteria for planning premiums and indices 
for enterprises must be settled,· and these '~1:'1ter1a testE;'d tll~o-\lgb • 
4c . atnpbell, p. 169. 
5 Zverev, p. 16. 
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system of economic experiments in diff~ent b~anch~ of tJ>.e _economy. 
Then, from the results of this experimentat~on, con~r~~~ propos~ls. ·Of _ 
reform could be formulated. 6 .. -
In addition to the stimulation of discuss~o~ .in search o~ metpods 
by which to improve Soviet planning, the Liberm~ prop~sals have :had-~ 
partial. effect at the operational_level.ot the e~on~my. This .~act_is 
reflected in the guarded effort of Soviet planners to experiment with 
"libermanist" type reforms on a &mflll sc~le _in the _ec;onomy. In July, 
1964, an experiment was attempte~ i~ _dec~tr~~z~d ccm.tr.ol: at: two· _l.arge 
clothing plants - the Bolshevichka· pl~t:_~ -~oscow and;_·the ~yak plant 
in Gorky. 7 Briefly, the experiment allowed the_ establ~shment- of pr-ofi~-
ability as the main indicator for. evaluat_ing the ~~ccess o_f :th~ firm, 
. ., - ··. ' . ,, ' 
for rewarding the managers, and the use of. dir~ct ~ontr~cts· :b~twe~ 
producers and retailers as thf:! basis for· plannµlg and ·sched~ling- prodµc-
tion. The centr~l authorities ~aiptain~d:\_.~on~ro~_,q.y~r ~P,riceJ_,_. 1•jor 
capital i~vestments, s~e~, ~~.,proj1:t~b~lity :t~rg_~ts·._ .. ,. ,_ .: t J. · 
After one year of operation, .the experillle~t was -consJ.dered a success 
when results showed that the_ key iQ.dic~tors of .oµtput, _p_rofit, and 
8 profitability at both the firms were above the pre-test levels. The 
experiment was then extended to 400 firms in the apparel, textile, and 
leather industries. 9 While the expansion of the initial experiments was 
6 Kasitskii, p. 15. 
7 1 " Imogene Eno, "Economic Reform in the Soviet Consumer Industr es, 
New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part II-B, Studies Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 
Congress of the u. s., (Washington, D.c., u. ·s. Government P-rit:tng-Off:l:ce·, 
1966), p. 558. 
8 Ibid., p. 559. 
9 Campbell, p. 93. 
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being carried out, Premier Kosygin laid the groundwork for a major 
reform of all Soviet industry in a speech before the central committee 
of the Communist Party of the USSR. 10 This reform eliminated the 
traditional emphasis on gross output·as an indicator and emphasized 
the role of profits, bonuses, and the value of sales along with recommen-
. '. ' '•, -, •,. t 
dation for direct contracting among firms and for levying ··an ··tnteres~ 
charge on invested capital. 11 · -· _ ·· - ·~ .·.·· ·· 
These reforms are the first steps toward im~rovin~ the tra~i~io~a1 
. ,n~ - :/:~: ... · ..... 
system of Soviet planning, but at the same time should not be construed 
to inE1ugurate the formation of a ."free market"· type ·systmiF:ln--)the:,soviet 
- ' .· ... ·,_··,_·,_ -......... - ... ~-- · .. (. t: .. ·.·:,-; 
Union. As such reforms. are gradually implemented ·-and fu'.rtber applied --to 
the actual operations. of Soviet indu.try; ·their succes·s1w:£ll·-de,end in 
. '' . . ·- - . ~ ~ . . ' 
a large measure on such factors as the sipiific~ce of Soviet prices, 
• • • I • ' \ • ~ ,f, t. j ' ... I .. .. , ~ , __ .. \ .. , t.. ' • ' } ~ :, .. 'I, • ', _.; ~ 
the adequacy of incentives,. and. the 'availability(· of tlie necetitlary equip-
12 
ment and materials. The va~ious degrees· of succe~1f ~na iaiiure 
associated with these and further reforms will provide much data for 
further study in the problem& faced-by a piannea,· Soviet-type economy 
and for analysis of the possible solutions to such problems. 
10 Eno, p. 564. 
11Ibid. 
12 Gregory Grossman, Economic Systems, ·(Ettglewood· 'Cliffs, New J,ersey, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 96. 
. ) .. :.· .. ~ . "· 
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APPENDIX A 
STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET PLANNING INSTITUTION* 
USSR Government 
* * , .. ,,,. 
Supreme Council of National Economy 
* ('., ,. l .,.,... :·~~ * 
' . .,_-, ........... u, __ .... 
Gosplan USSR Sovnarkhoz 
* 
* 
Big Planning. Regions 
•~*;I 
* 
Republican · Governments:· ~ t .,, 
*· 
·* 
Republican Gosplans 
* 
* Sovnarkhozy 1 
* 
* Local-Authority-Oblast 
* 
* 1.··. 
Sector Departments· 
• 
* Unioq-Republican & Local Enterprises 
*Source: Alec Nove, p. 73. 
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